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Abstract 
Political tension causing diplomatic strains rarely escalates into direct violence or war. 
This paper identifies the economic effects of such non-violent political tension by examining 
Taiwan’s sovereignty debate. Non-violent events harming the relationship with mainland 
China lead to an average daily drop of 200 basis points in Taiwanese stock returns. The 
impact is more severe on firms openly supporting the Taiwanese pro-independence party. 
Through a series of tests we identify this economic penalty as initiated by mainland 
authorities, who specifically target political opponents that are economically exposed to 
mainland China via either investments or exports. 
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1 Introduction 
 
While it has been documented that physical violence in political disputes can negatively affect 
stock prices (e.g. Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Zussman and Zussman, 2006; Guidolin and 
Ferrera, 2007), other cost factors of political tension have largely been left unexplored. This paper 
studies the non-violent diplomatic disputes between China and Taiwan to identify the cost of 
political tension that can be attributed to the use of political power or economic pressure. The study 
further merges with research on the value of political connections (e.g. Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006; 
Acemoglu, Hassan and Tahoun, 2014) by demonstrating that the cost of conflict is partly 
attributable to economic and strategic targeting of political opponents. 
To elaborate, the paper examines how increased political tension in Taiwan’s sovereignty 
debate has affected stock returns using two different data sources. First, major political events back 
to 1995 constitute the basis of an event study. Despite none of the events having led to direct 
physical confrontation or violent actions, the results show that on average Taiwanese stock returns 
fall by 400 basis points in the course of two days (announcement date and the following trading 
day), which translates into an average 200 basis point drop in daily returns. Moreover, the adverse 
effect is long-lasting and suggests a real economic impact of political tension. Second, the analysis 
also employs survey data available since 2006, where the Taiwanese public is asked about their 
short-term expectations on political tension with mainland China. This analysis reveals that the cost 
of political tension is more comprehensive than previously documented as months of increased 
expected political tension are associated with lower average stock returns of Taiwanese firms. In 
other words, not only do realized distress events strongly affect stock returns, but increases in 
expected future tension levels similarly associate with declines in present stock returns.  
The paper explores the channels through which political tension affects stock returns. In 
particular, it reveals that the cost of political tension in part stems from economic pressures targeted 
at selected companies. As the main political debate in the cross-strait relationship centers on the 
issue of Taiwan independence, we study the impact of political tension on firms associated with 
either of the two opposing political axes in Taiwan. We determine a firm’s political association by 
the political connection of its founders and/or managers, which we obtain from online search 
records that links them to either of the two major opposing political coalitions (e.g. through party 
membership, close personal ties, public statements, etc.). Using this unique, hand-collected dataset 
the paper uncovers a differential stock price reaction, where Taiwanese firms politically connected 
to the pro-independence coalition (‘anti-China’ firms) are more negatively affected than firms 
publicly supporting a Chinese national identity (‘pro-China’ firms). Evidence shows that Taiwanese 
3 
 
firms labeled as ‘unfriendly’ to mainland China see their stock prices suffer disproportionally in 
times of political distress.  
The analysis further shows that these economic pressures on political opponents concentrate on 
Taiwanese firms with high mainland exposure through either exports or investment. We also 
examine whether the detrimental effect on exporting firms is likely to stem from the reactions of 
mainland consumers or mainland authorities. We do not find that firms offering brand-name 
consumer-products to mainland China are more vulnerable to changes in political tension, which 
leads us to conclude that Chinese consumers are not actively boycotting Taiwanese products and 
that the economic impact is more likely to originate from a politically strategic government 
response. 
Lastly, the paper offers three additional results that supplement our main conclusions. First, the 
negative impact of political tension extends to Chinese stock returns, where the impact is less 
severe, consistent with the mainland’s economic and military strength vis-à-vis the island of 
Taiwan. Second, despite all our events are non-violent ex-post, they can still involve a risk of war 
ex-ante. This creates a separate stock market effect that further adds to the cost of political tension. 
This cost is separately identified by documenting that firms located relatively close to potential 
military conflict zones experience a larger drop in stock returns when tension rises. Third, given the 
detrimental stock market effect of political tension, we also study whether this is due to a reduction 
in expected cash flows of firms or because it leads to higher risk premia. We find evidence of both 
as mainland investment and foreign sales of Taiwanese firms drop around tension increasing events 
and investors simultaneously demand higher yields on Taiwanese government bonds. Overall, our 
results align with theoretical models of political uncertainty (e.g. Pastor and Veronesi, 2013) and 
the general conclusion that the impact of uncertainty may not be limited to the financial market, but 
further feed into the overall macro economy (Baker and Bloom; 2012, Bloom et al., 2012). 
The paper differs in three aspects from other studies on political instability and stock market 
reactions. First, existing studies mostly examine stock market outcomes within violent settings, 
such as World War II (Frey and Kucher, 1999; Waldenström and Frey, 2006), the war in Iraq 
(Amihud and Wohl, 2004; Rigobon and Sack, 2005; Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2009), the Basque 
conflict in Spain (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003), the civil war in Angola (Guidolin and Ferrara, 
2007), the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Zussman and Zussman, 2006; Zussman, Zussman and 
Nielsen, 2008), the Arab Spring (Acemoglu, Hassan and Tahoun, 2014), etc. In contrast, we 
propose a framework to assess the impact of non-violent political tension and identify the channels 
through which the cost occurs. We then go on to examine the case of Taiwan and mainland China 
through two measures of political tension – obtained from historic events and survey data – that do 
not cover periods of physical confrontation. Instead, the events include relatively ‘softer’ acts (such 
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as speeches or statements by political figures) and the surveys capture expected political tension, 
which offers a relatively subtle measure of the public’s political sentiment.1 Thus, the study focuses 
on the financial impact of a shift in the general political climate, which offers broader implications 
as the majority of international political conflicts do not escalate into direct violence. 
Second, by measuring political tension by both historic events and public opinion surveys, this 
paper captures and compares the effects of both realized/current and expected/future political 
instability. Our results not only show that realized distress events strongly affect stock returns, but 
expectations on future tension are also associated with a statistically significant and economically 
relevant decline in average daily stock returns (approx. 25 basis points). Moreover, as the data from 
public opinion polls covers a relatively stable period in the cross-strait relations, the results 
additionally reveal that political tension is inherently costly at all times, rather than merely being 
limited to times of concrete conflict or immediate crisis. 
Third, the paper contributes by exploring the mechanism through which political tension ends 
up being costly, showing that both economic pressure and risk of war are at play. This is possible by 
examining the heterogeneous effects on firms across political connections, geographical locations 
and their degree of economic linkage with China. To our knowledge, only Fisman, Hamao and 
Wang (2014) have previously examined the detailed channels of economic pressure under cross-
country tension, but in a setting absent of heterogeneity across political connections.
2
 As described 
above, evidence shows that the price of political tension originates not only from the threat of 
military action, but also from economic pressures primarily targeting companies with mainland 
exposure and considered hostile towards the Chinese authorities. These results are consistent with 
anecdotal evidence and empirically verify that the political tactics utilized by mainland China align 
with historical threats made by Chinese officials. To exemplify this, the Taiwan Affairs Office – a 
Chinese agency responsible for setting and implementing policies related to Taiwan – stated in 2004 
that Beijing does not welcome any Taiwanese business people who “make money in the mainland 
and then go back to the island to support Taiwan independence” (China Daily, 2004; Taipei Times, 
2004a). 
                                                 
1
 This also differs from e.g. Berkman, Jacobsen and Lee (2011), who despite including (but not limiting themselves to) 
non-violent events, focus on selective and extreme disaster risk. Additionally, rather than studying effects on stock 
prices, a related literature studies the dynamics of violent conflict (Jaeger and Paserman, 2006, 2008) or examines the 
impact of military hostility and mistrust on house prices (Besley and Muller, 2012) and international trade (e.g. Martin, 
Mayer and Thoenig, 2008; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2009; Glick and Taylor, 2010). 
2
 Their study differs in their objective and approach, i.e. Fisman, Hamao and Wang (2014) study domestic industry 
effects and compare the results across two nations that vary along cultural dimensions such as language, history and 
structure, whereas we examine two groups that share a common ethnic and cultural background, but differ primarily in 
their political ideology. This follows from our alternative objective to measure the effect of purely opposing political 
views on stock returns, as opposed to the effect of cultural aversion. As such, Fisman, Hamao and Wang (2014) focus 
on two particularly stormy episodes in the Sino-Japanese relationship, whereas our study also examines relatively stable 
times absent of immediate crisis. 
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Our paper also extends the literature on the value of political connection by studying tension 
across national borders and documenting a value impact arising due to a response from a 
government other than your own. For example, Fisman (2001) and Acemoglu, Hassan and Tahoun 
(2014) demonstrate that increased uncertainty about the incumbent’s political power adversely 
affects stock returns of firms connected to the regime. We extend this by showing that the source of 
the adverse effect can be foreign, as cross-border disputes with China harm Taiwanese firms 
connected to the local pro-independence party, despite the domestic popular support for the pro-
independence party increases with tension. 
As such, this paper also relates to numerous highly tense political confrontations arising 
worldwide, such as the Falkland Islands sovereignty conflict, U.S.’ embargo on Cuba, Russia-
Belarus gas disputes, Bolivia-Chile sea access debate, strained Sino-Japanese relations, China-
Vietnam territorial and oil rights disputes, etc. – all of which are characterized by high tension but 
no ongoing day-to-day physical confrontation. This paper offers insights into the economic costs – 
and the channels through which they occur – of such non-violent political disputes.  
Lastly, the results are of wider interest considering China’s global economic prominence and 
their propensity for using economic pressure to voice political displeasure and to silence opposing 
political views. One example is the conferral of the 2010 Norwegian Nobel Peace Prize to the 
Chinese human-rights activist Liu Xiaobo, which was not only met with harsh criticism by the 
Chinese authorities, but also precipitated harsh economic consequences. Specifically, China 
suspended all on-going talks on a free-trade agreement with Norway and imposed additional 
restrictions on shipment entries – leading to a 62% drop in sales of the Norway’s famed salmon to 
China.
3
 Similarly, following the 2014 Hong Kong protests local artists and entertainers had their 
mainland performances “indefinitely postponed” after publicly showing support of the pro-
democracy rallies. Chinese state-run media commented that the celebrities had “violated the 
principles of ‘one country, two systems,’ [and] challenged the authority of the central party” (The 
New York Times, 2014). The findings of this paper are consistent with such examples, as shifts in 
the political climate in the Taiwan-China cross-strait relationship not only impact average 
Taiwanese stock returns, but particularly affect those firms associated with the ‘undesirable views’ 
of the pro-independence party. 
The paper proceeds by outlining the conceptual framework and argumentative structure for 
testing the primary hypotheses (section 2). Following this overview, we next describe the cross-
strait relationship (section 3.1), the data (sections 3.2-3.5) and the identification strategy (section 
                                                 
3
 See e.g. CNN (2010), The Independent (2011) and The Economist (2012). The Chinese authorities moreover snubbed 
Norwegian ministers and suppressed the news in China (Washington Post, 2010; The Economist, 2012). Norwegians are 
also the only Europeans not eligible for visa-free visits to Beijing (Financial Times, 2012). 
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3.6). The empirical analysis of the outlined hypotheses follows in section 4. Lastly, section 5 adds 
an examination of the effects on cash flow and risk premia, and tests theoretical predictions on the 
impacts of uncertainty shocks, while section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Conceptual Framework 
Consider a setting of a relatively peaceful world where violent conflicts are rare among 
governmental entities. However, strains in bilateral diplomatic relationship are unavoidable, which 
creates fluctuations in political tension, characterized by threats of economic or even military 
measures. 
In such a setting, the question in which we are interested is whether seemingly mild political 
tension between two governmental entities has any impact on economic outcomes, and through 
which channels this might occur. Compared to the well-documented effects of war, it is not obvious 
that such disputes between two governments should have a significant impact on economic activity. 
It can, however, be argued that such political unrest raises the risk of war. Additionally, is not 
unusual to observe threats or actual measures of economic sanctions in such a setting. 
To measure the costs associated with political tension, a good measure of economic value is 
necessary. While the average citizen may be indifferent to political tension or perhaps emotionally 
one-sided (e.g. due to patriotism), financial markets are likely to be relatively unbiased but yet 
responsive to the intensification of political tension. Albeit imperfect, firm stock prices therefore 
serve as our primary proxy for economic value. Moreover, firms are heterogeneous in their 
exposure to potential war, economic sanctions, consumer boycotts, etc. Thus, studying possibly 
heterogeneous stock price reactions across firms offers a tractable setting to measure the cost of 
political tension as well as to diagnose the mechanism through which it appears. 
Within this framework, Figure 1 outlines our testable hypotheses and the logical progression of 
the paper. The first issue of interest is whether political tension, even in the absence of violent 
confrontation, has a detrimental effect on the stock market. 
 
Hypothesis H1: Non-violent political tension affects stock returns 
This hypothesis can be tested by measuring the average announcement effect of non-violent 
events identified as having increased political tension, as well as the cumulative impact of such 
events over subsequent periods. Additionally, we explore how stock returns react to political 
tension measured by public poll data. The event and survey data, which constitutes our two 
measures of political tension, is described in section 3.3 and the empirical results on the average 
effect is presented in section 4.1. We also detail the possible endogeneity issues of the two measures 
and provide solutions. 
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If results show that non-violent political tension negatively affects stock returns, the next task is 
to understand through which mechanism this happens. We focus on two possible channels: the 
threat of war and economic punishment of political opponents (cf. Figure 1). 
 
Hypothesis H2: Stock price drops due to risk of war 
Firms may face heterogeneous degrees of war risk resulting from their different geographical 
location and distance to the relevant ‘border’. Therefore, one may test the hypothesis by comparing 
stock returns across firms’ geographical locations. In our study, even though none of the events led 
to physical confrontation ex-post, it does not imply that there is no risk of war ex-ante.  We thus 
examine whether firms close to potential areas of military warfare are more strongly affected by 
increased political tension than others in more distant areas (these geographical areas are detailed in 
section 3.4).  
Since the increased probability of military invention is likely to be destructive through various 
channels, this approach will also capture the broader costs of potential warfare. To give an example, 
there could be an expectation that ports close and transportation slows down as military forces 
mobilize into conflict zones. In other words, the estimated costs associated with the risk of war are 
not only limited to damaged infrastructure or loss of life, but will also incorporate a more general 
disruption of economic activities due to military invention. 
 
Hypothesis H3: Stock price drops due to targeted economic pressure 
Although it may be tempting to attribute all the negative effects of political tension to the 
increased risk of warfare, other forces may be at work. As economic pressure can be used more 
discriminatively than warfare, one can test hypothesis H3 by exploring if and how the impact of 
political tension differs across the political connections of firms (Test A of hypothesis H3 in Figure 
1). 
The current political tension between Russia and the West constitutes a recent example of such 
targeted economic pressure, where the U.S. and the E.U. have imposed financial sanctions on a 
shortlist of business tycoons with close ties to the Kremlin. Similarly, China appears to exploit its 
economic importance and influence in international political conflicts. The aforementioned Nobel 
Peace Prize disagreement with Norway and recent Hong Kong protests constitute only two such 
examples. Another high-profile example is the on-going territorial dispute in the South China Sea 
between China and the Philippines (among others), which has been associated with sudden 
restrictions on all banana imports from the Philippines to China, in addition to Beijing issuing a 
travel advisory that portrays the Philippines as anti-China (Washington Post, 2012). Thus, we 
attempt to examine whether China has asserted selective economic pressures on Taiwanese 
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businesses that can be classified as anti-China (identified and discussed in section 3.5). We 
hypothesize that Taiwanese firms are hurt more by increased tension if they are considered 
uncooperative by the Chinese government, e.g. because of their association to political parties or 
public statements made by senior management. 
As an additional test of this hypothesis, one can explore whether firms with a high degree of 
economic exposure are more severely affected. In general, if targeted economic pressure is imposed 
on political opponents, one would expect the detrimental effects to be felt more by those 
economically exposed to the conflict. For example, the conflict between Russia and the West is 
more likely to impact politically connected companies in Russia with economic relationships in the 
West, compared to companies operating primary domestically or in other geographical regions. 
Thus, in this setting, we additionally examine whether the detrimental impact varies with the 
degree of Taiwanese firms’ business exposure to mainland China (Test B of hypothesis H3 in 
Figure 1). If the detrimental effect originates from targeted economic pressure, one would expect 
anti-China firms with high mainland dependence and economic vulnerability to be more severely 
affected.  
 
Hypothesis H4: Mainland consumers are not responsible 
A negative economic impact on politically connected businesses may in principle be driven by a 
consumer response, rather than merely by economic pressures imposed by the opposing 
government. To determine the origin of the cost of political tension we propose investigating the 
effect on firms offering brand name consumer products. 
As a general example, the economic impact of the Russian conflict could in principle be driven 
by Western consumers boycotting Russian products, as opposed to being driven solely by 
government actions. Similarly, in our setting the economic impact could stem directly from 
consumer choices of the Chinese public, rather than being (only) a consequence of actions 
undertaken by the mainland authorities. Considering anecdotal evidence (cf. the quote on page 5 on 
pro-independence businessmen being unwelcome to the mainland), we hypothesize that the effect is 
not driven by mainland consumers. We test the hypothesis by examining the effect on anti-China 
firms selling well-known consumer products in mainland China. 
To elaborate, it may appear reasonable to assume that a consumer boycott will hit consumer 
products more severely than products sold directly to businesses. A complication, however, is that 
perhaps the opposing government is also more likely to target consumer goods compared to 
business-to-business products. Thus, to reliably test whether the economic cost of political tension 
stems from either a consumers or government reaction, it is not sufficient to compare only 
consumer and business-to-business products. As a more fruitful approach, we propose that a boycott 
9 
 
will hit companies with recognizable consumer brands more severely compared to companies 
offering less known products. Thus, in our setting, when Taiwanese exports to the mainland are 
decomposed into brand name consumer products and other (non-brand) consumer products, a 
consumer boycott will lead to a stronger effect on producers of branded consumer goods 
independent of the government’s action.4 The definition of brand name products and the hypothesis 
testing is presented in section 4.4. 
 
3 Data and Identification 
3.1 Background and Setting 
Taiwan’s sovereignty has long been disputed, with mainland China claiming ownership of the 
island. To provide a brief historical background of the setting, the Chinese Civil War was fought in 
1927-1949 between the Communist Party of China and the governing party of the Republic of 
China. The war ended with mainland China being taken over by the Communist Party and 
establishing present day People’s Republic of China. The receding government resettled to the 
island of Taiwan, which formally still bears the name Republic of China. No peace treaty has ever 
been signed and mainland China still claims the island of Taiwan (and vice versa). The cross-strait 
relations in the post-war era have accordingly been characterized by periodic political crises and 
occasional threats of military action. 
The present day political landscape in Taiwan consists of two dominant party coalitions that 
disagree on whether to move towards increased independence or, alternatively, strengthen mainland 
integration. On one side is the Pan-Green Coalition, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 
which primary political axis involves Taiwan independence over Chinese reunification. On the 
other side is the Pan-Blue Coalition, led by the Kuomintang (KMT), literally meaning the Chinese 
National People’s Party, which favors a Chinese national identity over a separate Taiwanese one. 
                                                 
4
 More specifically, if the government takes no targeted action but only consumers target brand name consumer 
products, we can conclude that a negative impact on those producers is initiated by mainland consumers (and if there is 
no measurable effect, then there is no consumer reaction). Similarly, if also the government specifically targets brand 
name consumer products we would similarly observe a larger impact on firms selling brand name consumer products 
(i.e. the stronger effect is independent of government actions). In this latter case, however, we cannot distinguish 
between a consumer or government driven effect. But this does not become an issue since the results (in Table 4) show 
no incremental effect on consumer brand producers, implying no consumer reaction (neither is there government 
reaction targeted only on consumer brands). Thus, based on these results the only assumption needed (to conclude that 
consumers do not react) is that the negative effect of a potential consumer boycott is not being cancelled out by 
government actions directly aimed at assisting anti-China firms offering brand-name consumer products in mainland 
China. 
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The latter standpoint accordingly implies a softer cross-strait policy and increased economic linkage 
with mainland China.
5
 
3.2 Data 
The study covers political events occurring since 1995 and is further supplemented with survey 
data available since 2006 (see full description in section 3.3). Daily stock market data and annual 
financial statement data is compiled from the Thomson One Banker platform, which incorporates 
Thomson Financial databases such as Datastream and Worldscope. Additionally, industry level data 
on exports and investments of Taiwanese firms in mainland China is obtained from the Taiwanese 
Bureau of Foreign Trade and the Taiwan Stock Exchange. Table 1 shows the summary statistics of 
the key variables used in the econometric analysis.  
As shown in Table 1, the study includes approximately 700 publicly listed Taiwanese firms and 
twice as many Chinese firms, where the exact number varies across the two data samples and time 
periods (cf. panels A and B). The summary statistics are broken down across those Taiwanese firms 
that support either of the two political parties (pro- vs. anti-China views, cf. section 3.5). Similarly, 
the table separately summarizes the sub-sample of Chinese firms that are geographically close to 
Taiwan compared to those that are not (South-East coastal firms vs. the rest). As detailed in section 
2.4 the study examines the costs associated with the risk of a cross-strait war by examining the 
differential stock market outcomes across these two geographic regions. 
3.3 Measures of Political Tension 
The study offers two types of measures of political tension. First, major political events in 
history are recorded and constitute the basis of an economic event study. Second, the analysis also 
employs survey data, which offers a repeated monthly measure of the expected political tension 
among the general Taiwanese public. 
 
A. Events: Sudden and Unexpected Elevation of Tension 
The International Crisis Group (ICG) records political events across the world and documents 
them in their regular Crisis Watch reports. The ICG describes each event and why it has increased 
political tension. Events that deteriorate the political climate between Taiwan and China are 
recorded by ICG back to 2003. Additionally, we collect historical data by compiling events listed 
on the Chinese-language Wikipedia page “The Timeline of Cross-Strait Relations” back to 1995. 
During the post-2003 period, the major events reported by the two sources are the same. Since 1995 
                                                 
5
 In more detail, the Pan-Green Coalition is an informal political alliance consisting of the Democratic Progressive 
Party, Taiwan Solidarity Union and the minor Taiwan Independence Party. The Pan-Blue Coalition is a political 
alliance consisting of the Kuomintang, the People First Party and the New Party. 
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there are eight events reported across the two sources and thus constitute the basis of our event 
analysis. All events are sparked by controversial statements or actions involving the political status 
of Taiwan (e.g. pro-independence sentiments, description of ‘state-to-state’ or ‘one-country-on-
each-side’ relations, etc.), but where no actual physical confrontation materializes.  
The events are fully detailed in Appendix A. Both sources list the original news reports of each 
event, allowing us to identify the date when the event first appeared in the press. However, there are 
two exemptions. First, the ICG records a deteriorating cross-strait relationship in November 2003 as 
“Chinese officials responded sharply to Taiwanese President’s calls for a new constitution and right 
to hold referendums” (CrisisWatch, 2003, p. 6). This event is neither abrupt nor unexpected, as the 
call for a new constitution came at least several weeks earlier. Thus, as this sequence of events is 
not clearly timed it cannot reliably be included in the event study analysis. Second, in August 2006 
tensions rose as “China continued negotiations with three Taiwan allies for oil/gas exploration” 
(CrisisWatch, 2006, p. 7). As this similarly constitutes a continuation of a prolonged action where 
the event date cannot be clearly defined (we have no records of when the talks started) we again 
have no choice but to exclude it. This process therefore leaves us with six notable and well-defined 
events that are described in Appendix A, where the starting point of our sample is marked by the so-
called 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis, and the sample ends with the last event covered noted by ICG 
in early 2006.
6
 
 
B. Survey Data on Tension Expectations 
The Taiwanese “Global Views Survey Research Center” has since 2006 conducted regular 
surveys on locals’ views on the cross-strait relationship. The center is a member of the 
Commonwealth Publishing Group (including member companies such as Harvard Business Review 
– Chinese Edition) and is accepted in Taiwan as both a credible and neutral source (Taipei Times, 
2011), resulting in regular citations by foreign media and research institutes.
7
 In each survey 1,000 
people in Taiwan above 20 years old are contacted via computer-assisted telephone calls, which 
matches the sample size traditionally used in nationwide Gallup polls in the U.S. (Gallup, 2014). 
The representativeness of the sample is checked in each survey by using information on gender, age 
and education by residential areas from the population census (Global Views, 2014). Although the 
surveys on cross-strait relations are only conducted between June 2006 and September 2011, they 
are repeated every month during this period and provide a unique indication of the public’s short-
                                                 
6
 Upon an email inquiry of why there are no tension increasing events documented after 2006 (such as the March 2014 
protests against a trade deal with China), the ICG replies that “Our publication is mainly designed to alert readers to 
situations where there is particular risk of new or significantly escalated conflict … there have been no significant 
developments recently that have warranted the inclusion of the Taiwan Straits.” 
7
 These include Bloomberg, Businessweek, Financial Times, Hoover Institution, LexisNexis, Reuters, The Brookings 
Institution, The Wall Street Journal, etc. See expanded list with links to citing articles here: 
http://www.gvsrc.net.tw/dispPageBox/GVSRCCP.aspx?ddsPageID=CITE&. 
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term expectations on the political climate towards mainland China. More precisely, the survey asks: 
“In general, what is your opinion on the relationship between Taiwan and the mainland next month 
comparing with this month?” The research center aggregates the responses and we consistently 
construct a month-by-month dummy variable capturing the expected tension over the June 2006 – 
September 2011 period, i.e. taking the value of 1 for months in which tension is expected to rise, 0 
otherwise. Out of the 63 months in the 2006-11 period, there are a total of 30 months (widely 
scattered) in which the tension level is expected to rise (cf. Figure A.1 in an online appendix). 
The survey data offers a unique supplement to the event data as it captures changes in expected 
political instability, rather than changes caused by actual realized events. In other words, rather than 
being solely based on major moments in history, the survey data offers a more subtle ‘day-to-day’ 
measure in the political attitude of the general public. Additionally, as no events harming the cross-
strait relationship are documented after 2006, this measure provides additional evidence of the cost 
of political tension in relatively stable times. Thus, one can expect a relatively lower impact of 
political tension on stock returns using this 2006-2011 measure of political tension. 
3.4 Data on Geographical Location (Risk of War) 
We hypothesize that firms close to potential areas of military warfare will be more strongly 
affected by increased political tension than firms in more distant areas. However, as the island of 
Taiwan is relatively small, such a comparison is not meaningful among Taiwanese firms. Instead, 
we examine Chinese firms close to the island of Taiwan compared to Chinese firms headquartered 
in other more distant parts of the mainland. The geographical location of firms is based on their 
local province as stated in their financial accounts. The firms classified as close to Taiwan are those 
nearby the South-East coast of China, i.e. firms located in the provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, and 
Zhejiang, and the Municipality of Shanghai. A map of Taiwan and these mainland provinces is 
provided in Appendix B. All of the gray-colored coastal provinces are within reach of the 
Taiwanese mobile land-attack cruise missile system, which is one of the primary defense systems 
available to Taiwan (Thim, 2013; Wendell, 2013). Furthermore, in case of military warfare the 
involvement of this particular coastal region is enhanced by the U.S. being a de facto ally of Taiwan 
and historically having ordered U.S. aircraft carriers to be present in this conflict zone (BBC, 2014). 
3.5 Data on Political Connection (Targeted Economic Pressure) 
We determine a firm’s political association according to the political connection of its founders 
or managers who represent the firm. A firm is classified as ‘anti-China’ if its founder or manager 
publicly supports Taiwan independence or has close ties to the DPP (or other parties in the Pan-
13 
 
Green Coalition). Conversely, if the founder/manager supports reunification with the mainland, the 
KMT or other Pan-Blue Coalition parties, the firm is defined as ‘pro-China’. 
In order to gather this information we first hand-collect a list of founders and managers of the 
firms that are listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange. We then use the Google search engine to find 
news reports on the political connections of every name on our list. The key words in the search are 
a combination of the names of the founder (who often is also the chairman), the manager, the name 
of the firm, one of the names of leaders of the major parties (Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Lien 
Chan, Ma Ying-jeou, Soong Chu-yu, Tsai Ing-wen) and one of the terms “Democratic Progressive 
Party”, “Kuomintang”, “Taiwan Independence” or “referendum”. We read through the top 30 
search results (first 3 pages) and repeat every search for each combination of key words in both 
simplified Chinese and traditional Chinese.
8
 When filtering the search results we ignore articles 
from personal blogs, unless we find the same information from other formal sources. Also, we 
attempt to find the same information from both Taiwanese and Chinese media and limit ourselves to 
classifying only cases where there is no disagreement across media outlets on the political 
connection of firms. 
Using this information, political connection is established through either observed party ties or 
public statements. First, the political connection can be established if the founder/manager of a firm 
is a member of a given party, has ever been an officer in the government or an associated 
organization of the party, or has a close personal relation with the main leaders of the party. Second, 
business executives in Taiwan sometimes make public statements to express their supports towards 
Taiwan independence, the referendum on Taiwan’s UN membership, and/or one of the political 
parties. If a business executive has been making consistent statements over the sample period, 
his/her political connection is classified accordingly. In the end, this process results in 28 firms 
classified as anti-China and 41 firms as pro-China (the sample with full data availability varies 
across regressions). This sample size of 69 politically connected firms is on par with studies on the 
value of political connection, cf. Fisman (2001) who examines 79 firms connected to the Indonesian 
Suharto regime and Acemoglu, Hassan and Tahoun (2014) who study stock returns during the Arab 
Spring among 63 firms identified as politically connected to the Egyptian authorities. The detailed 
connections of all our political firms and the corresponding sources are outlined in Appendix C.
9
  
                                                 
8
 Based on about 20 randomly selected searches, the search results on page four and beyond are either irrelevant or 
repetitions of those on the first three pages.  
9
 A small sample of 14 firms are observed to have switched from anti-China to pro-China in the sample period, while 
there is no switch in the reverse direction. This occurs if managers or founders have unexpectedly changed their 
statements. In principle this makes an interesting data set, but it is far too small for statistical analysis and it is not 
feasible to determine an accurate switching date. Thus, these firms are instead excluded from the analysis of politically 
connected firms in order to produce results that are purely based on sharp and uncontested identification of political 
connectedness. When analyzing politically connected firms, we further exclude government operated firms since they 
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3.6 Empirical Strategy and Identification 
In the event study, the basic regression equation is of the following form: 
y
ite
 = β
1
TensionEventte + FirmControlsite + αi + γe + εite,  (1) 
where y
ite
 is daily percentage return for stock i on day t of event e. Each event window spans 20 
weekdays before and after the event day, where all other dates are excluded from the sample, and 
thus t constitutes the time period [-20, 20]. We focus on the effects of each event across two days, 
i.e. the event dummy TensionEventte equals to 1 on each announcement day and the following 
trading day, and 0 otherwise. Thereby we incorporate potentially lagged reactions and take into 
account that an announcement may arrive late in the day when markets have (almost) closed.10  In 
all specifications, we control for firm fixed effects (αi) and event fixed effects (γe) that respectively 
filter out the average return of each firm and the average return of all firms within each event 
window. Thus, the estimated coefficients report the impact of political tension on stock returns 
above and beyond the average return in the corresponding event period. As such the specification 
captures abnormal returns associated with increases in political tension. 11  We further include 
various firm level controls, such as the corresponding time-varying market beta of each firm in 
order to capture abnormal returns, as suggested by Acemoglu, Hassan and Tahoun (2014). These 
betas are obtained by regressing the daily stock returns of each firm on a constant and 
corresponding stock index return (Taiwan, Shanghai or Shenzhen) for the time period [-100, -20] 
prior to each of the six tension increasing events, which results in six beta estimates per firm. Other 
firm controls include firm size, leverage, and return on assets, as defined in Table 1. Also, in all 
firm-level regressions we allow the error term (εite) to be correlated both across time for any given 
firm and across firms within the same day of each event. Regression (1) is run separately for all 
Taiwanese and all Chinese firms. 
The identifying assumption in this specification is the exogeneity of each event, which creates 
an unexpected, sudden, and one-time increase in political tension. Hence, for each event – 
excluding the announcement day and the following trading day from the event window – the 
average return during the remaining 38 weekdays provides a measure of normal returns for each 
                                                                                                                                                                  
may switch sides with new election outcomes (likely with a lag, again making it infeasible to time the switch 
accurately). 
10
 Given the sheer mass of possible news outlets in both China and Taiwan, it generally infeasible to pinpoint the exact 
timing of when a news announcement first appeared within each day.  
11
 It is worth noting that additionally controlling for market returns when estimating the effect on the firm sample would 
not be valid. Specifically, since harmful political events also affect the overall stock market (as verified in regressions 2, 
4, 6 and 8 in Table 2), the effect of political tension on each stock would not be fully captured by the event dummy if 
the market return is also included as a control. Instead, and arguably more appropriately, we include period fixed effects 
(a dummy for each event window) to filter out average returns, implying that the event dummies measure the effect of 
political tension beyond the average market performance within the event period. 
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stock. Although in principle tension may either ease or build up after the first two days, no other 
major events occur within each event window. Besides, as is documented in the next section, within 
the 40-weekday window most of the stock price impact is realized on the event day and the 
following trading day. 
When investigating heterogeneous effects of political tension, e.g. effects on Taiwanese firms 
by political connections, we further expand the above regression into the following form:  
y
ite
 = β
1
TensionEventte + β2(TensionEventte × AntiChinai) + FirmControlsite + αi + γe + εite. (2) 
In this case, we run regressions only for politically connected Taiwanese firms, where AntiChinai is 
equal to 1 if the firm is connected with pro-independence parties and 0 if it is connected with the 
pro-unification parties. Similar specifications are adopted when exploring the effects on Taiwanese 
firms along other dimensions and on Chinese firms by geographical location. To make causal 
inference, the additional identifying assumption is that the events do not affect location and political 
connection directly. This assumption may be violated if firms migrate or change political 
connection upon seeing negative effects of the events. Although there is no evidence showing that 
Chinese firms move away from the South-East coastal area, it is true that some Taiwanese firms 
have switched from anti-China to pro-China (cf. footnote 9). However, this switching possibility 
should mitigate the long-run negative effects of political tension, as firms that have more to lose due 
to their political connection (anti-China firms) are more likely to switch. Thus, despite the 40-
weekday event window partially addressing this potential bias, the estimates should nonetheless be 
viewed as conservative lower bounds, as further discussed in section 4.3. 
One may still be concerned that political connection of non-switching firms is endogenous, i.e. 
firms self-select their political connections based on expected stock returns. However, by including 
firm fixed effects any time-invariant factors are controlled for. Furthermore, this logic of self-
selection suggests that the sample of pro-China firms should consist of firms expecting a larger 
benefit of such a connection compared to average firms; and similarly self-proclaimed anti-China 
firms anticipate a milder negative effect of supporting pro-independence parties compared to 
average firms. This would not automatically bias our estimates of the effects on anti-China firms 
relative to pro-China ones since the selection would go in the same direction for both groups (i.e. 
more positive for pro-China and less negative for anti-China). Besides, such an endogeneity issue 
would be further mitigated by the specifics of Taiwan's politics, i.e. tension-increasing events boost 
the popularity of anti-China parties (cf. Table A.5 in the Appendix) and thereby increase the 
likelihood of them being in power – and firms benefit by being connected with the party in power 
(cf. Table A.6 in the Appendix). Thus, tension-increasing events partially work in favor of anti-
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China firms, again tilting towards conservative estimates of the cost of tension. We elaborate on this 
in section 4.3 where the estimates are discussed. 
Finally, with monthly survey data on political tension, the main regression specification is: 
y
im
 = β
1
TensionExpectation
m
 + FirmControlsim+ GDPm + (DPP in power)m + αi + γ1m +γ2m
2+ εim (3) 
where the outcome variable is the average daily return of stock i in month m and the main 
explanatory variable, TensionExpectationm, is constructed from monthly survey data from June 
2006 to September 2011. Using public opinion polls conducted by a Taiwanese research center (cf. 
discussion in section 2.3), we define this month-by-month binary dummy as taking a value of 1 in 
months in which the Taiwanese public expects the political tension with mainland China to rise 
over the next month, and 0 otherwise. The identifying assumption here is that the tension 
expectation measure is exogenous conditional on other controls included in the regressions. This 
assumption will be violated if an omitted variable correlates with both tension expectations and 
stock returns, which we partially address by including a wide range of plausible explanatory 
variables and a quadratic time trend.
12
  Specifically, the same set of firm controls is included as 
before, in addition to the quarterly GDP growth rate (multiplied by 100) and the average stock 
return under different regimes is filtered out by including a binary dummy (DPP in power) that 
equals 1 whenever the pro-independence DPP party is in power in Taiwan, and 0 otherwise (in 
contrast, there is no variation in this variable within any of the event windows in the event-study 
regressions). Lastly, when exploring heterogeneous effects (similarly to equation 2 above) we 
interact the variable of interest (TensionExpection) with the political connection of Taiwanese firms, 
geographical location of Chinese firms, and/or other firm characteristics. The additional identifying 
assumption becomes similar to the one in the event study, i.e. that a change in tension expectations 
does not change firms’ location or political connection. 
4 Empirical results 
4.1 Testing H1: Average Effect 
Following our conceptual framework (cf. section 2 and Figure 1), we test hypothesis H1 by 
measuring the average effect of political tension on stock returns. Table 2 presents the results. The 
table first reports in regressions (1)-(4) the event-study estimates of consequential events harming 
the political relationship between China and Taiwan (events are detailed in Appendix A). The 
remainder of the table (regressions 5-8) reports the estimates associated with increases in expected 
                                                 
12
 In principle, we could add higher order functions of time to control for time trends. However, given the sample size 
and the limited variation in our tension expectation measure, a higher order time trend is likely to absorb all the 
variation in the tension measure. 
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future tension levels, as evaluated by public opinion polls among the Taiwanese public. In both the 
analyses the estimates are reported separately for Taiwanese and Chinese listed firms, where in each 
case the effect is examined on both the underlying firm sample and the local value-weighted stock 
index. 
Regression (1) in Table 2 reports the first key result of the paper, showing that tension-
increasing events are on average associated with a drop in stock returns of 2.03 percentage points 
for Taiwanese firms, which cumulatively amounts to 4.06 percentage points during the 
announcement date and the following trading day. The decline is strongly significant and, compared 
to existing literature, economically large. For example, Berkman, Jacobsen and Lee (2011) use a 
comparable methodology to ours to study a broader sample of international political crises over 
1918-2006 and find a more modest 0.12 percentage points reduction in monthly world stock returns. 
More related to our study, Fisman, Hamao and Wang (2014) report that the Nikkei 225 Index fell 
following an adverse shock to Sino-Japanese relations in 2005 by cumulatively 6.1% over the 
following month (in comparison, our cumulative 20-day effect is -10.9% as discussed below). 
Lastly, studies focusing exclusively on the effects of violent conflicts document a relatively smaller 
response. Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2009) estimate a 1.50% decline in U.S. stock price in the run-up 
of the Iraq invasion in 2003 and Zussman and Zussman (2006) relate assassinations of senior 
political targets to a 0.71 - 1.11% daily drop in the Israeli stock index. Thus, considering that the 
underlying events in our sample do not entail any reports of property damage or loss of life (even 
though they may involve implicit threats thereof), the estimate in regression (1) is comparatively 
large. The impact of political tension is further verified in regression (2), which reports a strongly 
significant 1.67 percentage point drop in the value-weighted Taiwanese stock index (TAIEX), or 
3.34 percentage points cumulatively over the announcement date and the following trading day. 
Together with regression (1), this establishes the overall detrimental impact of political tension on 
Taiwanese firms. 
Regressions (3) and (4) in Table 2 repeat this analysis for Chinese firms and find that political 
tension is costly to Chinese firms as well. On average, each tension event leads to a daily drop of 
0.72 – 1.19 (or cumulatively over two days 1.42 - 2.38) percentage points in Chinese stock returns, 
where the stock index refers to the Shanghai Composite Index of all A-shares. Thus, compared to 
Taiwanese firms, the impact of a strained cross-strait relationship is statistically weaker and 
economically more modest for the Chinese sample, which intuitively conforms with the economic 
and military strength of mainland China vis-à-vis the island of Taiwan. Consistently, the results are 
both qualitatively and quantitatively similar for the Shenzhen stock index, which covers China’s 
second largest stock market (not reported, but available in Table A.1 in an online appendix). 
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The second half of Table 2 offers evidence on the negative effects of expected tension on stock 
returns. The binary dummy (TensionExpection) takes the value of 1 in months in which the 
Taiwanese public expects the political tension with mainland China to increase over the next month, 
and 0 otherwise. This variable is available in 2006-2011, and as no major events occur in this period 
(cf. Appendix A) one may expect a relatively lower impact on stock returns compared with the 
results of the event study. Overall, despite the methodological differences across the two 
approaches, the results using survey data align with those of the event study, indicating a negative 
impact of increased political tension (cf. column 5 reporting a 27 basis points drop in average daily 
returns among Taiwanese firms in months where expected tension rises, which corresponds to a 
27*20 weekdays = 5.4 monthly percentage point drop). As expected, the daily magnitudes are 
generally lower compared to the event study and the effect is weaker on Chinese firms compared to 
Taiwanese firms.  
In addition to offering supporting evidence to previously established event study results, these 
results are of interest in their own right as they show the existence of a detrimental effect of 
expected increases in political tension, even if no major events may realize (as is true for the 2006-
2011 period). In other words, these results indicate that ‘day-to-day’ changes in the political climate 
have a significant economic impact even in relatively politically stable times.  
Overall, results in Table 2 offer strong support for hypothesis H1 in that not only do non-violent 
political events negatively affect stock returns, but so do changes in the political atmosphere that are 
not accompanied by any particular or concretely defined political events. Thus, the overall cost of 
political tension is likely to be more extensive and far-reaching than previously documented in the 
literature. 
 
Cumulative Impact 
Before turning to the mechanism through which political tension causes drops in stock returns, 
we study its cumulative impact and find evidence of a long lasting impact. We apply the standard 
event-study methodology with a constant mean return model (MacKinley, 1997), where abnormal 
returns over a [-20,+59] event window are defined as the realized return on each stock minus its 
average return over the prior 80 weekdays.13  Figure 2 reports the cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) across all Taiwanese firms. The figure reveals that the immediate impact is quite strong, i.e. 
around 2.0 to 2.5 percentage points drop per day during the first two days, remarkably consistent 
with estimates in Table 2 considering the methodological differences. In the following three weeks 
                                                 
13
 As an alternative approach to predict the normal return, we also estimate a market model following MacKinley 
(1997) where realized stock returns are regressed on market returns for the preceding time period [-100,-21]. The results 
are available in Figure A.2 in an online appendix and are similar to those presented in Figure 2. However, for the 
methodology to be valid, it must be assumed that overall market returns are unaffected by the individual events, which 
is violated (cf. regression 2 in Table 2). 
19 
 
(until weekday 15), CAR stays relatively stable within the range of -5.0 to -6.8 percentage points. 
Further drops during days 15-20 lead CAR to reach -10.9 percentage points on day 20, although 
CAR is measured less precisely as we move further away from the event day.14 Beyond the first 
month (weekday 20), the effect is furthermore persistent and long-lasting with no clear sign of 
immediate reversal. To provide confidence bounds we further regress CAR on 10-day-period 
dummies to establish the average CAR within each sub-period and the confidence interval thereof. 
The confidence bounds naturally widen over time as the event date becomes more distant, but the 
tension effect nonetheless remains significant after 2 months (around 50 weekdays). In summary, 
the political tension has a sizeable stock market impact, which is also long-lasting. 
Lastly, these results suggest that increased political tension has real effects rather than only 
affecting investor sentiment. More precisely, if the effect is purely sentiment driven and has no 
impact on the real economy, then the effect would be temporary and prices would soon revert to 
prior levels reflecting only fundamentals. Alternatively, if political tension has real effects then no 
immediate return reversal should occur, i.e. the impact of increased political tension would be 
permanent. As Figure 2 depicts a long-lasting effect without immediate reversal, it suggests real 
detrimental effects of political tension that are not merely sentiment driven. In section 3.4 this result 
is further supported with evidence of a disproportionate decline in stock returns among Taiwanese 
firms economically exposed to mainland China through either exports or mainland investment. This 
topic is also revisited in section 4. 
4.2 Testing H2: Risk of War across Geographical Locations 
To test hypothesis H2 on the effect of war risk (cf. Figure 1), we report differential effects by 
geographical location in regression (1) of Table 3. As previously described in section 3.4, Chinese 
firms located closer to the island of Taiwan, i.e. in the South-East coastal provinces, are more likely 
to be influenced by an increased risk of war, compared with those situated elsewhere in mainland 
China (cf. the map in Appendix B). The results show that the negative impact of political tension is 
stronger for South-East coastal firms, who experience an additional 27 basis points decline in stock 
returns per day – or 54 points cumulatively in two days – relative to more distant firms, who are less 
exposed to military conflict between China and Taiwan. This result is further supported by the 
analysis of survey data in regression (2). 
Additional tests further identify risk of war as the plausible cause for these results. First, it could 
be argued that Chinese firms close to Taiwan on average do more business with Taiwanese firms, 
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 The sudden drop in CAR on days 0 and 1 and its relative stability on other days provide a justification for our 
identification assumption. That is, the events cause an unexpected one-time increase in political tension on days 0 and 1, 
while tension is relatively constant on other days in the [-20, 20] event window. Furthermore, as noted in section 2.6, if 
tension still builds up after the first two days, our approach provides a lower bound of the actual effect.  
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thereby explaining this geographical pattern. However, after further controlling for investment and 
export by Taiwanese firms to industries of the Chinese firm sample, the geographical pattern 
remains (results are available in Panel A of Table A.3 in an online appendix). Thus, these 
geographical results cannot be explained by trade links. Second, the effect of geographical 
proximity dilutes as we consider the next layer of provinces. For example, adding a separate control 
for the next set of coastal provinces closest to Taiwan (Hainan, Guangxi and Jiangsu) does not 
return a significant effect on firms located in those areas, which rules out a more general coastal 
effect (regr. 2 and 5 in Panel B of Table A.3. in an online appendix). Similarly, a control dummy for 
a broader uninterrupted layer of (inland) provinces (i.e. Hainan, Guangxi, Hunan, Jianxi, Anhui and 
Jingsu) does not pick up a significant effect, nor does it affect the estimates for the closest coastal 
provinces (cf. regressions 3 and 6 in Panel B of Table A.3). Simply stated, these results show that 
the effect of geographical proximity dies out as we move further from Taiwan. 
Taken together, the results do not reject hypothesis H2 and suggest that the risk of war in the 
cross-strait region contributes to the cost of political tension. Furthermore, since mainland China 
dwarfs Taiwan in terms of military power, this is a particularly notable result. Specifically, despite 
the relatively lower risk and weaker impact of a Taiwanese attack, Chinese firms are nonetheless 
adversely affected. Accordingly – although it cannot be established with a similar geographical 
analysis for the relatively small island of Taiwan – it is reasonable to presume that the threat of 
military action is even costlier for Taiwanese firms. 
4.3 Testing H3: Economic Pressure across Political Connection 
We next test hypothesis H3 on targeted economic pressure by exploring firms' political 
connection. As previously noted, the primary debate across Taiwanese political parties involves the 
issue of Taiwan independence versus eventual unification with China. Thus, we classify firms as 
either pro-China (KMT and/or eventual unification supporters) or anti-China (DPP and/or 
independence supporters) based on party ties or public statements made by senior management, as 
described in section 3.5 and fully documented in Appendix C. We correspondingly define the 
binary dummy variable AntiChina to take the value of 1 for anti-China firms and 0 for pro-China 
firms. 
The results show heterogeneous effects across political connections of firms, where anti-China 
firms are on average hurt more by increased political tension. This is presented in Regression (3) in 
Table 3, which interacts measures of political tension with political party ties (cf. equation 2 in 
section 2.6). More precisely, anti-China (pro-independence) firms experience an additional 21–
basis-point fall in daily stock returns compared with pro-China firms favoring mainland unification. 
This accumulates to 42 basis points over the course of the announcement day and the following 
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trading day. The 2006-2011 survey measure of Taiwanese tension expectations produces consistent 
results, as reported in regression (4).
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The differential effect across political party ties is both economically and statistically 
significant. For example, in comparison Acemoglu, Hassan and Tahoun (2014) report that during 
the 2011 Arab Spring in Egypt a turnout of 500,000 protesters in Cairo on average lowered daily 
stock returns of firms politically connected to the incumbent party by 80 basis points relative to 
other firms. Thus our estimated effects are arguably large when considering that the data sample 
solely contains events absent of property damage, injuries or death (cf. hundreds of casualties 
during the protests in Egypt). Moreover, for the following two reasons, the estimates in Table 3 are 
likely to represent a lower bound of the detrimental effect. First, while increased political tension 
may induce economic pressures targeted towards political opponents of mainland China, it also 
increases the probability that the Taiwanese pro-independence party comes to (remains in) power. 
In other words, as political tension rises, so does the probability of having a Taiwanese government 
that is friendlier towards anti-China firms (defined as those publicly supporting it).
16
 As increased 
political tension thereby also positively affects anti-China firms, the estimates in Table 3 merely 
represent the net effect of these two counteracting channels. Second, since senior management of 
anti-China firms are likely to be aware of some of the political risks associated with their pro-
independence sentiments, they may already have taken measures to dampen any detrimental effects. 
For example, one can imagine that anti-China firms may already be hedging their political risks by 
reducing their relative economic exposure to mainland China. Thus, the empirical analysis only 
picks up the non-hedged effect of political tension, which further implies that the estimates in Table 
3 represent a lower bound of the total costs of political tension to anti-China firms. 
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 Furthermore, an extended placebo analysis shows that these results are unique to events harming the cross-strait 
relationship. Specifically, we repeat the analysis using three events that do not relate to the conflict, i.e. i) the 21 
September 1999 earthquake in Taiwan, ii) the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and iii) increased tension in Japan-Taiwan 
relations following the ‘Lianhe fishing boat incident’ on June 10 2008, where a Taiwanese fishing vessel collided with a 
Japanese patrol vessel in disputed territorial waters claimed by both sides. This placebo event study shows no indication 
of an amplified negative effect on anti-China firms (in fact, the effect is non-significantly positive), thereby ruling out 
that the results in Table 3 merely reflect a more general return differential across political parties in times of distress. 
This analysis is available in Table A.4 of the online appendix. 
16
 This is verified in two ways. First, we take the change in the popularity of the two parties (measured by so-called 
Kuomintang Trust Index and Democratic Progressive Party Trust Index) and regress that on the TensionExpectation 
dummy. The results show that increased tension expectations are associated with a statistically significant increase in 
support of the DPP pro-independence party in 2006-2011, while support for the KMT decreases. Second, using the 
events of the presidential election in Taiwan in 2004 (DPP won) and 2008 (DPP lost), we see that DPP winning (losing) 
the elections is associated with relatively higher (lower) returns of firms politically connected to the DPP. These 
supplementary results are available in Tables A.5-A.6 in the online appendix. 
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4.4 Testing H3 & H4: Pressure across Economic Exposure 
The More Mainland Exposure of Anti-China Firms, the More They Are Hurt 
If the negative effect of supporting Taiwan pro-independence originates from economic 
pressures, one would expect anti-China firms with high mainland dependence to be more severely 
affected. This corresponds to Test B of hypothesis H3 (cf. Figure 1).  
Taiwanese firms’ exports to mainland China is the most direct measure available on mainland 
exposure. However, firm-level export data is unavailable and likely to be endogenous in any case, 
since firms may have endogenously chosen export levels by considering the likelihood of being 
targeted by economic pressure. Instead, data on annual exports by industry to mainland China is 
obtained from the Taiwanese Bureau of Foreign Trade, where each firm’s economic exposure is 
defined as the total exports of its industry to mainland China (in the calendar year prior to each 
event), normalized by total exports to all countries during the same period. Using industry averages 
can further mitigate endogeneity concerns by providing a proxy for the counterfactual export level 
of politically connected firms in the absence of potential economic and political pressure (after all, 
the industry averages are taken across all firms, most of which are not politically connected and 
thus less exposed when choosing their export level). To analyze the relationship between the cost of 
political tension and export intensity to mainland China, regression (1) in panel A of Table 4 reports 
the results of interacting this measure with tension events and firms’ political party ties.  
The results show that an unexpected increase in political tension is not costlier to anti-China 
firms than to pro-China ones if firms have no exports to mainland China (non-significant coefficient 
-0.06). This intuitively follows from those firms being less vulnerable to the economic pressures 
imposed by the mainland, while at the same time these firms may still benefit from the pro-
independence party being more likely to take power as tension increases (cf. discussion in section 
4.3), resulting in a cancellation of the two counteracting effects. Instead, the negative impact 
concentrates on anti-China firms with mainland exports (-0.03*). Thus, economic pressures are 
most severe among anti-China firms that the mainland can most easily target, which provides 
consistent evidence for hypothesis H3. 
Regression (1) in panel A of Table 4 yields three additional results. First, heterogeneous effects 
by exposure suggest that the drop in stock returns following increased political tension represents a 
true impact on the real economy, rather than solely a sentiment driven stock price movement. This 
aligns with the long-lasting effect of increased tension previously established in Figure 2 and is 
further verified in section 4.
17
 Second, the effect on anti-China firms is not a result of potential 
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 One may alternatively argue that investors merely expect Taiwanese exporters supporting pro-independence to be 
particularly hurt, which in principle is sufficient to drive down stock prices even in the absence of any real effects on 
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targeted bombing. More exactly, if there was a risk that military actions by mainland China were 
specifically directed towards their political opponents, then the negative effect of political tension 
would not be restricted only to those anti-China firms who export to the mainland. This result 
therefore reinforces the role of economic pressure, underlining that the costs go beyond those 
attributable to the risk of war. Third, the estimates show that pro-China firms benefit from exporting 
to China when keeping political tension constant (0.01*), while anti-China firms in the same 
industry do not enjoy this positive effect (0.01-0.01=0). This indicates that impact on anti-China 
firms is not merely a result of industry targeting (e.g. targeting industries with many anti-China 
firms), but is more selective and strategic than that. 
The results in regression (1) can be further verified by another measure of mainland exposure, 
namely the amount of mainland investment undertaken by Taiwanese firms. This measure is 
motivated by Imai and Shelton (2011), who show that stock prices of Taiwanese firms with 
mainland investment are sensitive to the electoral outlook of the 2008 Taiwanese presidential 
elections. However, it should be emphasized that this investment measure captures a different 
aspect of mainland exposure than exports, as mainland investments may not necessarily translate 
into goods or services offered to the mainland market (for example, the Taiwanese firm Foxconn 
has factories in China producing iPhones that are sold not only in China, but worldwide). This 
investment data is obtained from the Taiwan Stock Exchange and gives the total cumulative 
investment (without depreciation) in mainland China by all listed firms in a given industry, which 
we normalize by the total asset value of all listed firms in that industry.  
Regression (2) in Table 4 applies this measure of mainland exposure and confirms previous 
results.
18
 As before, among firms without mainland exposure, increased political tension does not 
adversely affect anti-China firms more than pro-China ones, consistent with non-investing firms 
being less vulnerable to economic pressures from the mainland. The results further confirm that the 
extra negative effect on anti-China firms centers entirely on those with mainland exposure (-
0.46***). In contrast, for pro-China firms the negative impact of tension is mitigated when having 
mainland investment (by an amount of 0.16***). This differential effect across political parties 
increases with the level of mainland investment. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
exports. However, it is unlikely that investors hold on to such beliefs for extended periods without any supporting 
evidence. Indeed, tension between Taiwan and the mainland has created numerous incidences (including the six major 
events in our paper) from which investors can easily learn and adjust their expectations. It is thus doubtful that investors 
systematically form erroneous expectations. Besides, real declines in exports following political tension are likely and 
have been documented in Fuchs and Klann (2011), who show that countries whose leaders met with the Dalai Lama, the 
exiled Tibetan leader, suffered a swift decline of 8.1% - 16.9% in exports to China. 
18
 The investment measure is not available before 1998 (at which time its disclosure became mandatory), but to allow 
for inclusion of the events occurring in the pre-1998 period, the time-constant average of this measure is applied 
(explaining why some terms drop out in regressions due to firm fixed effects). 
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While the above results do not identify whether economic pressures are induced by either the 
Chinese government or the Chinese public, they nonetheless suggest the former. Specifically, in 
order for the negative economic impact on anti-China firms to be a consumer reaction, the Chinese 
public would not only have to be fully aware of the political connections of Taiwanese firms, but 
also be able to identify those anti-China firms investing in mainland China (which is non-obvious if 
they are not selling their products in China). This information is more likely to be documented by 
Chinese government identities that serve to both monitor and react to tensions in the cross-strait 
conflict. To test this more carefully, we next examine whether the negative impact on anti-China 
firms is more severe for those offering well-known consumer products to the Chinese public. 
 
It’s Not the Consumer, it’s the Government 
As argued in section 2, to test hypothesis H4 and study whether a reaction of mainland 
consumers or the mainland government drives the detrimental effect, we examine the stock price 
effect on firms offering brand name consumer products. The reasoning is that if the detrimental 
effect is driven by consumer boycotts, we would expect a stronger impact on firms selling branded 
consumer goods that are more likely recognized as Taiwanese by the mainland public. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that mainland consumer hostility towards Taiwanese businesses 
occasionally results in boycotts of brand name goods and services, although it is unclear whether 
this has a sizeable empirical effect (in particular compared to e.g. government blacklisting). To give 
an example, in 2004 a Taiwanese star-singer (Chang Hui-Mei) sang the national anthem of the 
Republic of China (Taiwan) at the inauguration of the Taiwanese pro-independence president (Chen 
Shui-bian). This sparked protests in mainland China and online boycotts were signed to express 
discontent and warnings that pro-independence artists were not welcome (BBC, 2004; Taipei Times, 
2004b). Following this public response a Taiwanese firm (Tingyi), whose beverage products 
featured the singer, removed her image from its products. However, it remains unclear whether such 
consumer reactions are on average detrimental to pro-independence Taiwanese brand name 
businesses (which would suggest that consumer boycotts drive our empirical results) or if the 
negative impact is concentrated more broadly on all Taiwanese products offered in the mainland 
(which would suggest a government response directed at all anti-China firms, regardless of their 
star-status). 
To test whether Taiwanese firms offering brand name products are more adversely affected, we 
collect additional information to categorize the products of every firm. Two dummy variables, 
ConsumerBrand and ConsumerNonBrand, are defined, taking the value of 1 if they belong to the 
corresponding category and zero if a firm mainly produces business-to-business products. To do 
this, we first identify consumer-focused firms as those for which the largest fraction of revenue 
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comes from the sales of consumer products. For each year of operation this information is obtained 
from firms’ annual reports and the Taiwan Stock Exchange, where we allow for the possibility that 
a firm changes categories over the sample period by using the information in the previous calendar 
year to determine a firm’s category at each point in time. We then further classify consumer focused 
firms as selling brand name products if they appear in publicly reported lists of the top 100 
Taiwanese brands as classified by ‘BrandingTaiwan.org’, which is a website established by the 
Taiwanese Bureau of Foreign Trade.
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 This breakdown across product types is shown in regressions 
(3)-(4) in Table 4. As we explicitly control for both the brand and non-brand consumer dummies in 
the regression analysis, the underlying benchmark category consists of firms producing business-to-
business products. 
Focusing solely on the estimates that directly test hypothesis H4 (highlighted in bold), regression 
(3) reveals that the incremental adverse effect of political tension on anti-China firms is not present 
among firms exporting business-to-business products (the interaction term Exposure * AntiChina * 
TensionEvent produces a non-significant coefficient of 0.00). The targeted-economic-pressure 
effect must therefore concentrate on anti-China firms exporting (either brand or non-brand) 
consumer products. The results indicate that in times of increased tension only non-brand consumer 
firms with anti-China ties are more adversely affected compared to their pro-China counterparts (-
0.12**). More to the point, the results in no way indicate that brand name consumer products are 
more severely affected in times of political distress (-0.03), implying that the negative impact on 
anti-China firms is unlikely to be driven by a consumer reaction. Instead, the non-significant impact 
on brand name exporters rather suggests a government response. 
Similar to regression (3), the detailed breakdown for the mainland investment variable is carried 
out in regression (4). However, it should be re-emphasized that this measure of mainland exposure 
is silent on whether investment outcomes are actually being offered to the Chinese public or not (cf. 
iPhone example, where only a fraction of the investment output is offered for retail sale in China). 
Hence, as the mainland investment variable offers a relatively opaque channel to Chinese 
consumers, the results cannot offer a fully conclusive interpretation. Keeping this caveat in mind, 
the key message of regression (4) is again that anti-China firms investing in the production of brand 
name products are not more severely affected compared to their business-to-business counterparts 
(0.86). 
Lastly, the full analysis is repeated in panel B of Table 4 for the more subtle survey measure of 
political tension covering the relatively peaceful 2006-2011 sub-period. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this 
data does not offer enough variation in political tension to identify a differential effect in times of 
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 The top 100 brand names in e.g. 2011 are available at  http://100.brandingtaiwan.org/files/winner.pdf 
26 
 
distress (cf. non-significant zero coefficients in regressions 1 and 2 of panel B, respectively). A 
further breakdown in regressions (3)-(4) similarly (and consistently to panel A) does not produce a 
more negative reaction for anti-China firms exporting or investing in brand name consumer goods. 
To summarize, not rejecting hypotheses H3 and H4 in Figure 1 implies that economically 
exposed and politically connected firms are adversely affected by a strategic and economic response 
of the opposing government. In practice, the mechanism through which this happens can vary, e.g. 
ranging from explicit import restrictions (cf. China’s salmon dispute with Norway) to indirect 
regulations or restraints (e.g. sanity issues raised with bananas from Philippines). According to the 
chairman of the ‘Taiwan Businesspeople Association’, other measures include stricter tax 
inspection, cutting down on loans available for Taiwanese business people and launching 
cumbersome investigations into their personal background and affiliations (Taipei Times, 2004b). 
The results of this paper align with such anecdotal evidence and additionally support existing 
research on the political tactics of mainland China. Most notably, Fisman, Hamao and Wang (2014) 
study the impact of recent adverse shocks to the Sino-Japanese relationship and similarly find that 
Japanese firms with high Chinese exposure suffer disproportionate declines in stock returns. They 
also show that the effect on Japanese firms is concentrated in industries competing with Chinese 
state-owned enterprises, which suggests that the economic cost of political tension originates from 
government-induced restrictions that damage the competitive environment of Japanese firms.
20
 
 
5 Additional Results: Cash flows, risk premia & uncertainty shocks 
5.1 Cash flow or risk premia? 
Given the detrimental stock market effect of political tension, a natural question to ask is 
whether this is due to a reduction in expected cash flows of firms or because it leads to higher risk 
premia. Although the data does not allow for fully disentangling the two, this section provides 
indicative evidence by studying outcome variables other than stock returns. 
Investment and foreign sales 
A challenge in such an analysis is the both the lack of data (e.g. no firm-level export data is 
available) and the general paucity of accounting and cash flow figures. However, to gauge at long-
term trends around tension events we regress i) accumulative investment in mainland China and ii) 
                                                 
20
 Moreover, the Sino-Japanese relationship has been more strongly characterized by consumer hostility than the 
Chinese-Taiwanese one.  To exemplify this, as of November 25, 2012, a search on Google.com  using the key words 
‘boycott’ and ‘Taiwanese products’ (dizhi taiwan huo) in simplified Chinese, gives 4.25 million hits, whereas 
combining the words ‘boycott’ and ‘Japanese products’ (dizhi rihuo) results in 10.2 million hits. Thus, considering that 
research shows no indication that Chinese consumers systematically boycott Japanese products, it is non-surprising that 
the same applies to Taiwanese products. 
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foreign sales of Taiwanese firms on quarterly/annual dummies and plot the corresponding dummy 
coefficients. More specifically, we run  
y
ite
 =  ∑ β
𝑘
D𝑘𝑡𝑒
T
k=-T
+ ∑ δ𝑘(D𝑘𝑡𝑒 × AntiChina𝑖)
T
k=-T
 + FirmControlsite + αi + γe + εite  (4) 
where yite is either (change in) quarterly investment in mainland China or (change in) annual foreign 
sales. Corresponding to the data frequency, the variable Dkte is either quarterly or annual time 
dummies (equals one if k=t, zero otherwise). Time t=0 is the time period including the event date of 
event e, while changes in an outcome variable in period t are measured as the increase/decrease 
from its level in period t and to that in t+1. Other variables are defined as before. The 
quarterly/annual coefficient estimates are plotted in Figure 3 and show the evolution of investment 
and foreign sales two years before and after the tension increasing events (for full regression results 
see Table A.7 in the online appendix). 
First, Figure 3 reveals a break in the trend of mainland investment among anti-China firms 
following increased tension in the cross-strait relationship. In contrast to pro-China firms, where 
mainland investment continues to accumulate at a steady rate, anti-China firms reduce mainland 
investment following increased tension and then follow a more modest trend thereafter. The same 
applies to foreign sales, where pro-China firms experience relatively steady growth compared to the 
fast-paced growth in foreign sales among anti-China firms, which then suddenly halts as tension 
increases. Taken together, these results suggest a fundamental and persistent effect of political 
tension. The observed breaks are also apparent when regressing changes in investment (foreign 
sales) on quarterly (annual) dummies and plotting the coefficient differences among the two 
politically connected groups in the latter half of Figure 3 (where estimates at t=0 denote the change 
between period 0 and 1). Both mainland investments and foreign sales drop as tension increases at 
t=0, where the drop in foreign sales is statistically significant at the 5% level (reported in regression 
4 in Table A.7 in the online appendix). 
Effects by industry 
The above results suggest that the previously documented drop in stock prices reflects (at least 
partially) a reduction in expected cash flows. As further suggestive evidence of this, we study the 
stock market reaction of firms in industries with particularly high international exposure. As the 
manufacturing industry has the highest ratio of foreign sales to total sales among all industries in 
Taiwan (26.8%), we rerun the benchmark regressions equations (1) and (2) with an added 
manufacturing dummy. This reveals that manufacturing firms suffer a greater stock return loss 
relative to other firms, as reported in regression (1) in Table 5 (this does not hold for other less 
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exposed industries, not reported). Moreover, breaking the results down across political connections, 
regression (2) in Table 5 reveals that this industry effect concentrates fully on anti-China firms. 
These results are consistent with there being a link between the stock market response and the 
documented cash flow effects. 
5.2 Risk premia 
In addition, the detrimental stock market effect may not only relate to reduced cash flows, but 
also be due to higher risk premia. To investigate this we collect yields-to-maturity on five-year 
Taiwanese sovereign bonds and regress those yields on our tension increasing event dummies. If 
increased political tension in the cross-strait relationship demands a higher risk premium this should 
be reflected in lowered demand for Taiwanese government bonds, which would lower government 
bond prices and increase yields. Consistently, regression (3) in Table 5 reveals that Taiwanese 
government bond yields rise by 0.86% during months of increased political tension with mainland 
China.
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 We therefore conclude that the detrimental stock market effect documented in previous 
sections is likely to be explained by both a reduction in expected cash flows and higher risk premia. 
5.3 Theoretical predictions on impact of uncertainty shocks 
The overall results of our paper indicate that increased political tension has both real and 
financial effects. This aligns with recent literature studying the impact of uncertainty shocks. In a 
seminal paper, Bloom (2009) offers a structural framework to analyze the impact of these 
uncertainty shocks, after observing that uncertainty appears to jump after major shocks like the 
Cuban Missile crisis and the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Baker and Bloom (2013) and Bloom 
et al. (2012) further show that uncertainty shocks can drive business cycles and significantly reduce 
GDP. Among the sources of uncertainty shocks, political/policy uncertainty is an important one. For 
example, Baker, Bloom and Davis (2012) find that increases in economic policy uncertainty 
foreshadow declines in output, employment and – consistent with our results – investment. Julio 
and Yook (2012, 2014) also empirically show that firms tend reduce investment as political 
uncertainty increases in election years – and the effect is more pronounced for foreign direct 
investment. More related, the impact of uncertainty shocks originating from political government 
actions has been examined on financial markets. For example, Kelly, Pastor and Veronesi (2014) 
study the option market to estimate the protection value against political risk, finding that options 
whose lives span political events (elections and global summits) tend to be more expensive, in 
particular amid higher political uncertainty. 
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 Simultaneously, stockholders are likely to shift to relatively safer government bonds, which raises bond prices and 
lower yields. Thus, the estimation picks up the net effect of these two counter-acting responses, implying that 0.86% 
represents a lower bound of the risk premia increase. 
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As a final exercise – and as a direct relation of our paper to existing work on (political) 
uncertainty shocks – we empirically test the theoretical predictions of Pastor and Veronesi (2013) 
who model stock market reactions to signals on future government actions. The model makes 
several testable predictions, most notably that political uncertainty should associate with i) higher 
risk premia, ii) more volatility and iii) higher stock return correlation.
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First, consistent with Pastor and Veronesi (2013) our results indicate that increased political 
tension results in higher risk premia (cf. previously described regression 3 in Table 5). Second, 
regression (4) in Table 5 reports the relationship between increased tension and stock volatility, 
measured as standard deviation of returns over the past 20 weekdays. Volatility rises with tension 
and the effect amplifies for anti-China firms, but neither coefficient is statistically significant. Third, 
in regression (5) value-weighted average percentage correlation is calculated within every 20 
weekday period and regressed on tension event dummies. The results show increased correlation 
among stocks in times of tension (non-significant) and the effect is stronger for anti-China firms 
(5.19*). Thus, it appears that loadings on the government variable (tension) differ across political 
connections. Overall, we conclude that our results are consistent with the theoretical predictions of 
Pastor and Veronesi (2013). 
 
6 Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper we study the economic cost of relatively ‘soft’ political tension by examining the 
dispute between Taiwan and mainland China. This is among the first papers to study the cost of 
non-violent political tension and to identify the channels through which firms are affected. We 
show that this cost is not only limited to significant escalation in tension caused by consequential 
events, but it is also substantial even when the expected tension mildly varies, which has not been 
previously established in the literature.  
In other words, the paper reveals that the cost of political tension is more comprehensive than 
previously documented. First, even non-violent and relatively mild political tension is associated 
with a sizeable drop in the stock market. Second, not only do realized distress events strongly affect 
stock returns, but increases in expected future tension levels are also associated with declines in 
present stock returns. Third, the negative stock market impact is not solely driven by threat of 
violence, but is supplemented by economic penalties targeted at selected businesses. These financial 
costs, which are both centrally organized and politically strategic, are shown to have significantly 
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 Pastor and Veronesi (2013) provide two additional predictions, i.e. that i) political uncertainty should be higher when 
economic conditions are worse and ii) the effects of political uncertainty on risk premia, volatility and correlation 
should be stronger in a weaker economy. These two predictions are not testable within our framework since our tension 
increasing events never occur in a weak economic state (the GDP growth ranges from 4.7% to 6.4% during our event 
windows). 
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damaging and long-lasting effects. Lastly, this detrimental stock market effect associates with both 
a reduction in expected cash flows (investment and sales) and higher risk premia.While the focus of 
our paper is on Taiwan and mainland China, there is reason to believe that the results apply to a 
broader set of highly tense, yet non-violent, political disputes worldwide. In support of this, a small 
body of cross-country literature associates political crisis risk with adverse stock market outcomes 
(Diamonte, Liew and Steven, 1996; Berkman, Jacobsen and Lee, 2011). Hence, empirically 
documenting the sizeable distress costs in the absence of physical confrontation has wider 
implications, since this characterizes the majority of international political conflicts. Furthermore, 
demonstrations and political unrest in democratic countries as are similarly unlikely to generate an 
outright war, but they could be related to volatile stock prices and economic pressure on political 
opponents. 
The results of the paper are inevitably of interest given the growing worldwide influence and 
economic muscle of China (and other autocratic emerging countries). Evidence indicates that 
mainland China uses this to its advantage by directly targeting Taiwanese political opponents that 
are economically exposed to the mainland. Our econometric analysis thereby supports the more 
casual observation that China systematically punishes their political adversaries. The analysis 
further reveals that these economic penalties do not stem from consumer boycotts of well-known 
products, but are rather initiated by the Chinese authorities. 
Such strategic targeting of political opponents, who are not directly under the control of the 
Chinese government, raises questions about the government’s effectiveness in promoting its 
political views. On the one hand, fewer Taiwanese firms have become anti-China as they have 
abandoned their open pro-independence stand (cf. footnote 9). On the other hand, when tension 
increases, the public popularity of the pro-independence parties in Taiwan increases (cf. Table A.5), 
consistent with the effects of violence on public opinions (Jaeger et. al., 2012). These differential 
effects on firms vis-à-vis the public were also observed in the 2014 Hong Kong protests. Although 
the pro-democracy goals mobilized hundreds of thousands of protesters, the involvement of public 
figures such as firm executives was rather limited (The New York Times, 2014). Our results on the 
economic costs of political tension therefore call for further investigation to better understand its 
associated political consequences. 
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Figure 1.  Framework for Analyzing the Cost of Political Tension 
 
The figure outlines the key hypotheses tested in the paper and simultaneously gives an overview of the progression 
through which the paper proceeds. Brief descriptions of the accompanying tests are given for each hypothesis and a 
reference to the corresponding sections of the paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
H1:  Nonviolent political tension affects stock prices 
Test:  Examine magnitude and duration of stock price 
reaction to changes in tension (section 4.1) 
 
H2:  Stock price drops due to risk of war 
Test:  Price drop depends on firms' 
exposure to war by geographic 
location (section 4.2) 
 
If not rejected, through which 
channels are stock prices affected? 
H3:  Stock price drops due to targeted economic 
pressure 
Test A:  Size of the drop depends on firms' political 
connections (section 4.3) 
Test B: Size of the drop depends on firms' economic 
exposure, i.e. exports or mainland investment 
(section 4.4) 
 
If not rejected, who is responsible – the 
mainland government or mainland consumers? 
 
H4:  Not consumers 
Test:  Firms selling consumer brand name 
products not more affected (section 4.4) 
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Figure 2.  Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
The graph presents the evolution of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for Taiwanese stocks during the pooled 
event window of all events. The abnormal return is calculated as the realized return beyond the average return 
during the 80 weekdays prior to the event window, i.e. days [-100, -21]. This calculation of returns is at the firm-
event level, i.e. for each firm in each event we calculate a different normal return based the average return during the 
estimation window. The confidence intervals are established around 10-day average CARs, which are obtained by 
regressing CAR on period dummies (one for each interval [-20, -11], [-10, -1], … , [50, 59]) and estimating firm-day 
clustered standard errors thereof. When calculating the confidence intervals we assume that normal returns are 
estimated without error, cf. MacKinley (1997). Detailed regression results are available in an online appendix (Table 
A.2). 
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Figure 3.  Mainland Investment and Foreign Sales 
 
The figure displays time dummy estimates from the regression yit = β1 Dt + β2 (Dt × Anti-Chinai ) + FirmControlsit + 
ai + εit,, where y is either (change in) accumulative mainland investment or (change in) foreign sales of Taiwanese 
firms in millions of Taiwanese dollars. Time is measured quarterly (for mainland investment) or annually (for 
foreign sales). The coefficient value from which the figure is drawn are detailed in the regression output of Table 
A.7 in an online appendix. The sample period is quarter -8 to quarter +8 (year -2 to year +2) surrounding event 
dates. Quarter/Year 0 is the time period including the event date of event e, while changes in an outcome variable in 
period t are measured as the increase/decrease from its level in period t and to that in t+1. 
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics 
 
The table reports means of key variables with standard deviations in parenthesis. The event study data consists of the 
20 weekdays before and after each event. The survey data is available at a monthly frequency (i.e. average daily 
returns within each month). Anti- and pro-China firms are those supporting Taiwan independence or mainland 
integration, respectively. Chinese coastal firms are those located in the South-East coastal areas of China (cf. 
Appendix B). Index returns represent the TAIEX and Shanghai composite stock indexes. Assets are reported in 
inflation adjusted (1998 base year) local currency, leverage is debt proportional to equity and return on assets is net 
income relative to total assets. Firm betas are obtained by regressing daily stock returns of each firm on a constant 
and the corresponding stock index return (Taiwan, Shanghai or Shenzhen) for the time period [-100, -20] prior to 
each of the six tension increasing events (i.e. six beta estimates for each firm). Exports to mainland China and 
cumulative mainland investment are at the industry level (the latter is only available since 1998). The data is 
winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. 
 
Panel A:  Data for event study, 1995-2006 
 Taiwan  China 
 
All firms Anti-China Pro-China 
 
All firms Coast 
Non-
Coast 
Number of firms 679 27 40  1,314 399 915 
Daily index return (%) -0.17    0.13   
 (1.54)    (1.68)   
Daily sample return (%) -0.20 -0.19 -0.21  0.05 0.05 0.05 
 (2.62) (2.49) (2.58)  (2.56) (2.56) (2.56) 
Assets (billions) 42.01 145.58 86.61  2.90 3.54 2.59 
 (139.89) (332.54) (192.76)  (7.10) (8.76) (6.12) 
Leverage 0.37 0.28 0.38  0.47 0.47 0.47 
 (0.38) (0.34) (0.38)  (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) 
Return on assets 0.04 0.03 0.04  0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Beta 0.85 0.81 0.85  1.08 1.05 1.10 
 (0.49) (0.43) (0.66)  (0.40) (0.37) (0.41) 
Mainland exports / Total exports (%) 8.04       
 (11.67)       
Mainland investm. / Total assets (%) 2.38       
 (2.20)       
 
Panel B: Data for survey regressions, 2006-2011 
 Taiwan  China 
 All firms Anti-China Pro-China  All firms Coast Non-Coast 
Number of firms 766 28 41  1,566 510 1,056 
Monthly (avg. daily) index ret. (%) 0.005    0.04   
 (0.37)    (0.41)   
Monthly (avg. daily) sample ret. (%) 0.002 0.004 0.002  0.07 0.06 0.07 
 (0.63) (0.60) (0.60)  (0.75) (0.73) (0.75) 
Assets (billions) 55.61 260.29 139.09  6.67 7.16 6.43 
 (204.82) (552.81) (323.08)  (30.13) (31.26) (29.58) 
Leverage 0.33 0.20 0.36  0.47 0.43 0.48 
 (0.39) (0.28) (0.37)  (0.44) (0.43) (0.45) 
Return on assets 0.04 0.03 0.03  0.03 0.04 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.08)  (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) 
Beta 0.88 0.91 0.96  1.07 1.06 1.07 
 (0.45) (0.46) (0.44)  (0.65) (0.89) (0.50) 
Mainland exports / Total exports (%) 17.88       
 (14.99)       
Mainland investm. / Total assets (%) 3.38       
 (2.33)       
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Table 2.  Political Tension and Average Returns 
 
This table presents results from regressions equations (1) and (3) outlined in section 2.6, where the dependent 
variable is daily percentage returns in columns (1)-(4) and average daily percentage return within the month in 
columns (5)-(8). The event data consists of the 20 weekdays before and after each event, where the dummy 
TensionEvent takes value 1 on announcement days and the trading day that follows, and 0 otherwise. Monthly 
survey data is available 2006-2011 and the dummy variable TensionExpectation takes value of 1 in months when 
political tension is expected to increase over the next month, and 0 otherwise. The GDP variable corresponds to the 
quarterly GDP growth rate in percentages of the corresponding region (Taiwan or mainland China). The dummy 
DPP in power that takes value one when the pro-independence party is in power in Taiwan, and zero otherwise. 
Other control variables are as defined in Table 1. Event study regressions include period fixed effects filtering out 
average return within each event window. Two-way clustered standard errors (clustering on firm-day) are reported 
in firm level regressions (1), (3), (5) and (7). Standard errors robust to autocorrelation are reported in index 
regressions (2), (4), (6) and (8). Statistical significance is reported at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. 
 
 
 Event study 
Daily stock returns (%) 
 
Survey data 
Average daily returns within month (%) 
 Taiwanese firms  Chinese firms  Taiwanese firms  Chinese firms 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
 Firm 
sample 
Stock 
index 
 Firm 
sample 
Stock 
index 
 
Firm 
sample 
Stock 
index 
 Firm 
sample 
Stock 
index 
            
TensionEvent -2.03*** -
1.67*** 
 -0.72** -
1.19** 
      
 (0.71) (0.33)  (0.36) (0.58)       
TensionExpectation       -0.27*** -0.24**  -0.01 -0.14* 
       (0.10) (0.12)  (0.14) (0.08) 
            
Ln(Total Assets) -0.01   -0.03   -0.01   0.00  
 (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.05)   (0.03)  
Leverage -0.01   0.04   -0.08**   0.01  
 (0.07)   (0.03)   (0.04)   (0.02)  
Return on Assets 1.95***   0.55***   0.89***   0.39***  
 (0.34)   (0.20)   (0.30)   (0.11)  
Beta -0.11   -0.02   -0.01   -0.03  
 (0.07)   (0.03)   (0.04)   (0.03)  
GDP       0.04 0.03*  0.44 0.46** 
       (0.02) (0.02)  (0.28) (0.20) 
DPP in power       0.08 0.13  -0.12 -
0.44** 
       (0.31) (0.11)  (0.46) (0.20) 
            
Number of obs. 91,203 233  166,425 230  45,379 63  90,410 63 
Number of firms 677 -  1,314 -  761 -  1,565 - 
Period fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  - -  - - 
2nd order time trend - -  - -  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes -  Yes -  Yes -  Yes - 
R
2
 0.04 0.07  0.01 0.05  0.09 0.18  0.04 0.13 
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Table 3.  Tension Costs:  Risk of War and Economic Pressure 
 
This table presents results from linear regressions estimating the effect of political tension across geographical 
locations and political connections of firms (cf. regression equation (2) in section 2.6 for the event study and 
equation (3) for the survey data). The sample period, dependent variable and measures of tension are as defined in 
Table 2. In columns (2) and (4), the outcome variable is the average daily stock return within the month. The 
SouthEast dummy takes value 1 for firms located in the South-East coastal regions close to Taiwan, and 0 otherwise 
(cf. Appendix B). The AntiChina dummy variable takes value 1 for firms supporting Taiwan independence and 0 for 
firms supporting mainland integration. Due to firm fixed effects these time-constant dummies drop out when not 
interacted with political tension measures. Control variables are as defined in Tables 1 and 2. Two-way (time-firm) 
clustered standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is reported at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 
1% (***) level.  
 
 
Outcome variable: (Average) Daily Stock Returns in % 
 Risk of war 
(Chinese firms) 
 Economic pressure 
(Taiwanese firms) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Event study Survey data  Event study Survey data 
      
TensionEvent -0.63*   -1.69**  
 (0.36)   (0.65)  
TensionExpectation  0.00   -0.28*** 
  (0.14)   (0.09) 
      
SouthEast * TensionEvent -0.27*     
 (0.14)     
SouthEast * TensionExpectation  -0.03**    
  (0.01)    
      
AntiChina * TensionEvent    -0.21**  
    (0.11)  
AntiChina * TensionExpectation     -0.06* 
     (0.03) 
      
Ln(Total Assets) -0.03 0.00  -0.02 0.07 
 (0.04) (0.03)  (0.07) (0.06) 
Leverage 0.04 0.01  0.06 -0.20*** 
 (0.03) (0.02)  (0.09) (0.05) 
Return on Assets 0.55*** 0.39***  1.96* 0.98*** 
 (0.20) (0.11)  (1.02) (0.36) 
Beta -0.02 -0.03  -0.19 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03)  (0.14) (0.04) 
GDP  0.44   0.03 
  (0.28)   (0.02) 
DPP in power  -0.12   0.14 
  (0.46)   (0.27) 
      
Number of obs. 166,425 90,410  10,126 4,280 
Number of firms 1,314 1,565  67 69 
Period fixed effects Yes -  Yes - 
2nd order time trend - Yes  - Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.01 0.04  0.03 0.10 
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Table 4.  The Channel of Economic Pressure 
 
This table presents results from linear regressions estimating the effect of political tension across political 
connections and economic mainland exposure of Taiwanese firms. The sample period, dependent variable, measures 
of tension and political views (AntiChina) are as defined in Tables 2-3. Mainland exposure (Exposure) is defined 
either as i) total exports of each firm’s industry to mainland China (in the previous calendar year) normalized by the 
total exports to all countries, or as ii) cumulative investment (without depreciation) in mainland China of each firm’s 
industry normalized by the total asset value of that industry. Both measures are in percentage terms. Since the 
investment variable is unavailable prior to 1998 we apply the time constant average thereof, leaving it unreported 
due to the fixed effects. Consumer focused firms are classified as those for which the largest fraction of revenue 
comes from the sales of consumer products, which we further categorize as brand name retailers if they rank among 
the top 100 Taiwanese brands on brandingtaiwan.org. All regressions include the same control variables as 
previously applied in Tables 2-3 (log-assets, leverage, ROA, GDP and DPP in power). Also, the (interactions of) 
dummies ConsumerBrand, ConsumerBrand * AntiChina, ConsumerNonBrand, ConsumerNonBrand * AntiChina 
are all included in the regressions but not reported to conserve space. Two-way (time-firm) clustered standard errors 
are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is reported at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. 
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Panel A: Event study 
 
Outcome variable: Daily Stock Returns in % 
 Mainland Exposure  Consumer Brand Names 
 (1) 
Exports 
(2) 
Investment 
 (3) 
Exports 
(4) 
Investment 
      
TensionEvent -1.90*** -2.06***  -2.04** -2.49*** 
 (0.71) (0.67)  (0.86) (0.75) 
AntiChina * TensionEvent -0.06 0.56  -0.13 0.38 
 (0.10) (0.36)  (0.46) (0.36) 
      
Exposure 0.01*   0.01**  
 (0.00)   (0.00)  
Exposure * TensionEvent 0.04 0.16***  0.02 0.31* 
 (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.18) 
Exposure * AntiChina -0.01***   -
0.01*** 
 
 (0.00)   (0.00)  
Exposure * AntiChina * TensionEvent -0.03* -0.46***  0.00 -0.24 
 (0.02) (0.09)  (0.00) (0.28) 
      
ConsumerBrand * TensionEvent    -0.19 0.26 
    (0.43) (0.54) 
ConsumerBrand * AntiChina * TensionEvent    -
2.57*** 
-3.37 
    (0.77) (7.51) 
ConsumerBrand * Exposure    -0.01*  
    (0.01)  
ConsumerBrand * Exposure * TensionEvent    0.09*** -0.15 
    (0.03) (0.14) 
ConsumerBrand * Exposure * AntiChina    -0.02  
    (0.01)  
ConsumerBrand * Exposure * AntiChina * TensionEvent    -0.03 0.86 
    (0.03) (3.19) 
      
ConsumerNonBrand * TensionEvent    0.28 1.35*** 
    (0.59) (0.37) 
ConsumerNonBrand * AntiChina * TensionEvent    0.46*** -0.43 
    (0.12) (0.52) 
ConsumerNonBrand * Exposure    -
0.04*** 
-0.04 
    (0.01) (0.09) 
ConsumerNonBrand * Exposure * TensionEvent    0.19*** -0.33* 
    (0.07) (0.17) 
ConsumerNonBrand * Exposure * AntiChina    0.05** 0.15 
    (0.02) (0.13) 
ConsumerNonBrand * Exposure * AntiChina * TensionEvent    -0.12** -0.18 
    (0.06) (0.36) 
      
Number of observations 10,126 10,126  10,126 10,126 
Number of firms 67 67  67 67 
Period fixed effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
2
nd
 order time trend - -  - - 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.04 0.03  0.04 0.04 
      
42 
 
Panel B: Survey data 
 
Outcome variable: Average Daily Stock Returns within the Month in %  
 Mainland Exposure  Consumer Brand Names 
 (1) 
Exports 
(2) 
Investment 
 (3) 
Exports 
(4) 
Investment 
      
TensionExpectation -0.28*** -0.33***  -0.37*** -0.40*** 
 (0.09) (0.09)  (0.10) (0.11) 
AntiChina * TensionExpectation -0.07 -0.04  0.00 -0.03 
 (0.05) (0.06)  (0.05) (0.05) 
      
Exposure -0.02***   -0.03**  
 (0.01)   (0.01)  
Exposure * TensionExpectation 0.00 0.02  0.004** 0.03* 
 (0.00) (0.01)  (0.002) (0.02) 
Exposure * AntiChina 0.02**   0.02**  
 (0.01)   (0.01)  
Exposure * AntiChina * TensionExpectation 0.00 0.00  -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.02)  (0.00) (0.02) 
      
ConsumerBrand * TensionExpectation    0.42*** 0.27** 
    (0.12) (0.13) 
ConsumerBrand * AntiChina * TensionExpectation    -0.18 -0.38 
    (0.36) (0.74) 
ConsumerBrand * Exposure    0.03* -0.01 
    (0.01) (0.05) 
ConsumerBrand * Exposure * TensionExpectation    -0.02*** -0.04*** 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
ConsumerBrand * Exposure * AntiChina    -0.06***  
    (0.01)  
ConsumerBrand * Exposure * AntiChina * TensionExp.    0.01*** 0.10 
    (0.0004) (0.19) 
      
ConsumerNonBrand * TensionExpectation    0.17** 0.20* 
    (0.08) (0.10) 
ConsumerNonBrand * AntiChina * TensionExpectation    -0.14 -0.09 
    (0.09) (0.10) 
ConsumerNonBrand * Exposure    0.00 0.01 
    (0.01) (0.05) 
ConsumerNonBrand * Exposure * TensionExpectation    -0.01** -0.05 
    (0.004) (0.03) 
ConsumerNonBrand * Exposure * AntiChina    0.01 0.06 
    (0.02) (0.06) 
ConsumerNonBrand * Exposure * AntiChina * TensionExp.    0.01 -0.02 
    (0.01) (0.06) 
      
Observations 4,280 4,280  4,280 4,280 
Number of id 69 69  69 69 
Period fixed effect - -  - - 
2
nd
 order time trend Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.11 0.10  0.11 0.11 
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Table 5.  Further Results: Industry Effects and Testing Theory 
 
This table first reports the effect of political tension on manufacturing firms (who have relatively high international 
exposure through foreign sales) and, second, tests the theoretical predictions made by Pastor and Veronesi (2013). In 
regression (3) the dependent variable is percentage changes in yield-to-maturity on 5 year Taiwanese government 
bonds. The results are drawn from monthly data that is available back to 1999, and thus exclude the first two tension 
events. In regression (4) volatility is measured as standard deviation of returns over the past 20 weekdays. In 
regression (5) we use the value-weighted average correlation for the anti- and pro-China samples respectively, 
where correlation is calculated for each firm-pair within every 20 weekdays (for each group, so two observations for 
each 20 weekday period). Correlation is reported in percentages and we allow correlation to be different across the 
two groups (by including an anti-China dummy, not reported). In regression (4) and (5) the event dummy equals one 
for one month, i.e. t=0 that corresponds to weekdays 2-21. Due to unusual stock price movements (cf. Figure 2), 
regressions (4) and (5) exclude the event day and the following trading day from the sample. 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Stock 
returns 
Stock 
returns 
ΔBond 
yield 
Volatility Correlation 
      
TensionEvent -1.81** -1.91*** 0.86* 0.09 3.39 
 (0.70) (0.65) (0.48) (0.17) (5.45) 
Manufacturing*TensionEvent -0.29*** 0.28    
 (0.11) (0.29)    
AntiChina*TensionEvent  0.37  0.03 5.19* 
  (0.28)  (0.02) (2.93) 
AntiChina*Manufacturing*TensionEvent  -1.07***    
  (0.32)    
      
Ln(Total Assets) -0.01 -0.02    
 (0.04) (0.07)    
Leverage -0.01 0.06    
 (0.07) (0.09)    
Return on Assets 1.95*** 1.96*    
 (0.34) (1.02)    
Beta -0.11 -0.19    
 (0.07) (0.14)    
      
Number of obs. 91,203 10,126 125 4,003 156 
Number of firms 677 67 - 67 - 
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes - Yes - 
R-squared 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.39 0.45 
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Appendix A.  Events 
 
The table outlines the major events that are used in the event study analysis. These events are compiled from Crisis 
Watch reports provided by the International Crisis Group and from the Chinese-language Wikipedia page “The 
Timeline of Cross-Strait Relations.” Both sources list news articles reporting on each event and we provide 
examples of these references in the last column of the table. 
 
 
Date Event Description Detailed reference 
July 18, 
1995 
1995-96 
Taiwan 
Strait Crisis 
After a speech made by Lee Teng-hui, president of the 
Republic of China (Taiwan), on “Taiwan's Democratization 
Experience”, the People’s Republic of China (mainland 
China) states that Lee harbors pro-Taiwan independence 
sentiments and is therefore a threat to stability in the region. 
Simultaneously, it is announced that China’s military will 
launch missile tests and fire ground-to-ground missiles from 
July 21 to 28 on the high seas of the East China Sea.  
China's official Xinhua 
News Agency (18 July) 
and The New York 
Times (21 July, 
“Chinese Missile Tests 
Seen as Intimidation”). 
March 5, 
1996 
Taiwan's 
First 
Presidential 
Election 
Beijing intended to intimidate the Taiwanese electorate from 
voting for Lee Teng-hui in the 1996 presidential election and 
therefore, on March 5 1996, China's official Xinhua News 
Agency announced that the People's Liberation Army would 
stage a new series of missile exercises just off Taiwan's coast 
from March 8 to 15. 
China's official Xinhua 
News Agency (March 
5) and CNN (March 8, 
“Nations Condemn 
Chinese Missile 
Tests”). 
July 10, 
1999 
“Special 
State to 
State” 
In his Deutsche Welle interview, Taiwan’s president Lee 
Teng-hui defined the Taiwan's relations with mainland China 
as “Special State to State”, implicitly implying that Taiwan 
and China are separate countries. China reacts furiously as it 
considers Taiwan a renegade province and the comment 
breaks from the long-standing ‘one China’ policy. 
Reuters (July 12, 
“Taiwan Says Junking 
‘One China’ 
Doctrine”). 
August 3, 
2002 
“One 
Country on 
Each Side” 
The concept of “One Country on Each Side” is espoused by 
Chen Shui-bian, the President of the Republic of China, 
regarding the political status of Taiwan, emphasizing that the 
People's Republic of China and Taiwan are two different 
countries (namely “one China, one Taiwan”), as opposed to 
two separate political entities within the same country of 
“China”. 
BBC News World 
Edition (August 3, 
“Taiwan Head Backs 
Independence Poll”). 
March 
14, 2005 
The Anti-
Secession 
Law 
The Anti-Secession Law is a law of the People's Republic of 
China. It formalized the long-standing policy of the People's 
Republic of China to use “non-peaceful means” against the 
“Taiwan independence movement” in the event of a 
declaration of Taiwan independence. The law was announced 
and simultaneously passed on March 14 (without any 
discussion, as is typically the case in mainland China). 
Washington Post 
(March 14, “China Puts 
Threat to Taiwan into 
Law”). 
February 
27, 2006 
National 
Unification 
Council 
Ceasing to 
Function 
Tension rose between Beijing and Taipei after Taiwan 
President Chen Shui-bian announced on February 27 that the 
National Unification Council and its guidelines would cease 
to function. The move brought condemnation from Beijing 
that called Chen a troublemaker and saboteur.  
The New York Times 
(February 28, 
“Taiwan’s Leader 
Defies Beijing’s 
Warnings”). 
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Appendix B: Geographical Location 
 
The map shows the provinces of China, where those geographically closest to Taiwan are highlighted in grey. These 
are the provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, and Zhejiang, and the municipality of Shanghai. Firm location is based on 
firms’ headquarter as stated in their financial accounts data obtained through Thomson Financial. 
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Appendix C: Political Connection 
 
The table lists the set of politically connected Taiwanese firms, where the classification is based on online search criteria detailed fully in section 2.5. The names 
are transcribed from Chinese into Latin scripts by the pinyin system and other commonly used names are also provided. It should be stressed that each 
classification has at least two sources, but for brevity only one of these is reported in the table. Also, direct web links are in some cases suppressed only to 
conserve space (e.g. in the cases where room is reserved for particular remarks). 
 
Firm Anti/Pro Founder/Chairman/CEO Remarks / online source: 
Accton Technology Anti An-Jie Huang (An-Jye Huang), Shiming Zhang http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2003/new/may/6/today-e6.htm 
Acer Anti  Zhenrong Shi, Zhentang Wang, Jianren Weng http://epaper.usqiaobao.com:81/qiaobao/html/2007-09/08/content_3783.htm 
Shin Hai Gas Anti Shouzhen Ding, Mingxing Lin http://old.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/FM/095/FM-C-095-041.htm 
Mercuries Data Systems Anti Hedong Chen, Xiangli Chen, Xiangzhong Chen 
Hedong Chen was ROC presidential advisor and major donor to a think tank affiliated with 
DPP. 
Cathay Real Estate Development Anti Qingkui Zhang, Luque Huang, Qingkui Zhang http://old.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/FM/095/FM-C-095-041.htm 
Hwang Chang General Contractor  Anti Chengjin Jiang, Chonglei Huang http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article/headline/20080529/30599829  
Hota Industrial Manufacturing  Anti Guorong Shen, Junzhi Chen http://www.businesstoday.com.tw/v1/content.aspx?a=W20111102026 
Shinkong Insurance Anti Xinhong Wu, Wenquan Zhan http://old.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/FM/095/FM-C-095-041.htm 
Taiwan Mobile  Anti Mingxing Cai, Xuanwu Lai http://old.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/FM/095/FM-C-095-041.htm 
Fubon Financial Anti Mingzhong Cai, Tianxing Gong http://old.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/FM/095/FM-C-095-041.htm 
Cathay Financial Anti Hongtu Cai, Zhanggen Li http://old.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/FM/095/FM-C-095-041.htm 
Hong YI Fiber Industry Anti  Zhenrong Shi (a.k.a. Stan Shi), Zhaojia Luo http://epaper.usqiaobao.com:81/qiaobao/html/2007-09/08/content_3783.htm 
Taishin Financial Anti Dongliang Wu, Longzheng Chen http://old.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/FM/095/FM-C-095-041.htm 
Shin Kong Financial Anti Dongjin Wu, Peng Xu http://old.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/FM/095/FM-C-095-041.htm 
Chong Hong Construction Anti Wenzhao Li, Yaozhong Li http://www.nownews.com/2008/12/19/320-2382961.htm 
Lien Chang Electronic Enterprise Anti Yuren Huang, Maoxiong Huang, Zhengang Chen http://www.nownews.com/2007/08/16/10844-2142153.htm 
Phytohealth Anti Chengjia Li, Wenhua Chen http://www.chineseunb.com/bbs/showthread.php?t=15288&langid=12 
Maywufa Anti Chengjia Li, Yuru Lai http://www.chineseunb.com/bbs/showthread.php?t=15288&langid=12 
Mercuries & Associates Anti Hedong Chen, Xiangli Chen 
Hedong Chen was ROC presidential advisor and major donor to a think tank affiliated with 
DPP. 
Taiwan Shin Kong  Anti Fengyao Li, Bofeng Lin http://old.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/FM/095/FM-C-095-041.htm 
Shinkong Synthetic Fiber Anti Dongshen Wu, XianZhong He http://old.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/FM/095/FM-C-095-041.htm 
Shinkong Textile Anti Xinhong Wu, Jinfa Qiu http://old.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/FM/095/FM-C-095-041.htm 
Tsrc Anti Qi Yin, Shaoyu Wang, Weihua Tu http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%AE%B7%E7%90%AA  
The Great Taipei Gas Anti Wenyi Wang, Rongfu Xie http://old.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/FM/095/FM-C-095-041.htm 
Weltrend Semiconductor Anti Ximing Lin, Kunchan Cai http://www.lihpao.com/?action-viewnews-itemid-55314 
Creative Sensor Anti Yuren Huang, Maoxiong Huang, Yucang Xie http://www.nownews.com/2007/08/16/10844-2142153.htm 
FIC Global Anti Mingren Jian http://www.nownews.com/2007/08/16/10844-2142153.htm  
Continental Engineering Anti Qi Yin (a.k.a. Nita Ing), Yiqian Hong http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%AE%B7%E7%90%AA  
Chinese Maritime Transport Pro Yin'gang Peng, Shundi Hong Close family relations to high-level members of KMT 
Twinhead International Pro Yunren Gao, Sifu Gao http://zh.wikipedia.org/zh-cn/%E9%AB%98%E8%82%B2%E4%BB%81 
BES Engineering Pro Qingjing Shen, Weili Cai http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%B2%88%E6%85%B6%E4%BA%AC  
Unitech Printed Circuit Board Pro Pingzhao Zhang, Yuanming Zhang, Zhenghong Xu Membership of KMT 
Hsin Kao Gas Pro Tianmao Chen, Jiandong Chen Membership of the KMT Central Standing Committee 
VIA Technologies Pro Xuehong Wang (a.k.a. Cher Wang), Wenqi Chen http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E7%8E%8B%E9%9B%AA%E7%B4%85  
President Securities Pro Qingyuan Gao, Ahua Zheng, Kuancheng Lin http://www.hudong.com/wiki/%E9%AB%98%E6%B8%85%E6%84%BF 
Kian Shen Corporation Pro Shiquan Chen, Shaobao Mai http://www.businessweekly.com.tw/article.php?id=42127  
China Television Pro Shengfen Lin, Tailin Li Run by KMT before December 2005 
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Cheng UEI Precision Industry Pro Taiming Guo (a.k.a. Terry Gou), Taiqiang Guo http://udn.com/NEWS/NATIONAL/NATS3/6782486.shtml 
Carnival Industrial Pro Kaitai Yan, Yucheng Jiang http://www.businessweekly.com.tw/article.php?id=42127 
China Motor Pro Kaitai Yan http://www.businessweekly.com.tw/article.php?id=42127 
Taiwan Acceptance Pro Kaitai Yan http://www.businessweekly.com.tw/article.php?id=42127 
China Petrochemical Development Pro Qingjing Shen, Xijin Cai http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%B2%88%E6%85%B6%E4%BA%AC  
Chunghwa Picture Tube Pro Tingsheng Lin, Shengchang Lin Tingsheng Lin was a member of the KMT. 
Jean Company Pro Zhenyuan Lin Zhenyuan Lin is the son of Tingsheng Lin 
Elitegroup Computer Systems Pro Wenyan Linguo, Zhihong Xu Wenyan Linguo is the wife of Tingsheng Lin 
Giant Manufacturing Pro Jinbiao Liu, Xiang'an Luo Advisory to ROC president (KMT’s Yingjiu Ma) 
Power Quotient International Pro Taiming Guo (a.k.a. Terry Gou), Taiqiang Guo http://udn.com/NEWS/NATIONAL/NATS3/6782486.shtml 
Hon Hai Precision Industry Pro Taiming Guo (a.k.a. Terry Gou) http://udn.com/NEWS/NATIONAL/NATS3/6782486.shtml 
HTC Corp. Pro 
Xuehong Wang (a.k.a. Cher Wang), Yongming 
Zhou 
http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E7%8E%8B%E9%9B%AA%E7%B4%85  
Sinopac Financial Holdings Pro Shouchuan He, Zhi'ang Xiao URL suppressed for brevity 
Chinatrust Financial Pro Liansong Gu, Yikui Wu http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E8%BE%9C%E6%BF%82%E6%B7%9E  
Altek Corp. Pro Shanke Xu, Ruwen Xia http://www.businessweekly.com.tw/article.php?id=42127 
Pan-International Industrial Pro Songfa Lu, Songfa Lu http://udn.com/NEWS/NATIONAL/NATS3/6782486.shtml 
Uni-President Enterprises Pro Qingyuan Gao, Zhixian Luo http://www.nownews.com/2003/09/06/703-1509446.htm 
President Chain Store Pro Qingyuan Gao, Zhongren Xu http://www.nownews.com/2003/09/06/703-1509446.htm 
Foxconn Technology Pro Dongliang Lin, Hanming Li Membership of Foxconn Technology Group 
Taiwan Glass Industry Pro Bofeng Lin, Boshi Lin http://www.nownews.com/2003/11/09/185-1540845.htm 
Ta Chong Bank Pro Jianping Chen, Rongdong Cai http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E9%99%B3%E5%BB%BA%E5%B9%B3  
Tatung Company Pro Tingsheng Lin, Weishan Lin, Wenyan Linguo Wenyan Linguo is the wife of Tingsheng Lin 
Ten REN Tea Pro Mingxing Li, Renzong Lin http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%9D%8E%E6%98%8E%E6%98%9F  
Teco Electric & Machinery Pro Zhaokai Liu, Chunzhi Qiu Brother of Zhaoxuan Liu(a former Premier of the Republic of China, from KMT) 
Tecom Pro Zhaokai Liu, Hede Guan Brother of Zhaoxuan Liu(a former Premier of the Republic of China, from KMT) 
Ton YI Industrial Pro Qingyuan Gao, Zhizhong Chen http://www.nownews.com/2003/09/06/703-1509446.htm 
TTET Union Pro Qingyuan Gao, Yisheng Huang http://www.nownews.com/2003/09/06/703-1509446.htm 
Taiwan Mask Pro Sanke Xu, Biwan Chen http://www.businessweekly.com.tw/article.php?id=42127 
Yulon Motor Pro Kaitai Yan, Guorong Chen http://www.businessweekly.com.tw/article.php?id=42127  
Yuen Foong Yu Paper Pro Xiuying Qiu, Peng, Zhong Membership of SinoPac Holdings Co whose director is Chuanshou He 
Yulon Nissan Motor Pro Kaitai Yan, Wenrong Cai http://www.businessweekly.com.tw/article.php?id=42127  
Green Energy Technology Pro Weishan Lin, Helong Lin Tingsheng Lin is a member of the KMT. 
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Figure A.1.  Months with Higher Expected Tension 
 
The figure shows months in which the Taiwanese public expects the cross-strait tension level to rise over the next 
month. This binary dummy is based on a survey conducted by the Taiwanese “Global Views Survey Research 
Center”. The monthly telephone survey collects views of locals on the cross-strait relationship. Starting in 2006 and 
ending in 2011 the survey asks: “In general, what is your opinion on the relationship between Taiwan and the 
mainland next month comparing with this month?” given a set of possible answers (worsening/improving/no 
change). The research center aggregates the responses and our binary dummy consistently takes the value 1 for 
months in which the overall public opinion expects the relationship to worsen, else 0. Out of the 63 months in which 
the survey is carried out, there are 30 months in which the tension level is expected to rise. 
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Figure A.2.  Cumulative Abnormal Returns (Market Model) 
 
The graph presents the evolution of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for Taiwanese stocks during the pooled 
event window of all events, supplementary to Figure 2 in the paper. A normal return equation for each firm in each 
event is estimated based on a market model following MacKinley (1997) where the realized return is regressed on 
the market return for the preceding time period [-100,-21]. The abnormal return is then calculated as the realized 
return beyond the predicted normal return from the estimated model. This calculation of returns is at the firm-event 
level, i.e. for each firm in each event we calculate a different normal return model. The confidence intervals are 
established around 10-day average CARs, which are obtained by regressing CAR on period dummies (one for each 
interval [-20, -11], [-10, -1], … , [50, 59]) and estimating firm-day clustered standard errors thereof. When 
calculating the confidence intervals we assume that normal returns are estimated without error, cf. MacKinley 
(1997). 
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Table A.1. Political Tension and Average Returns: Shenzhen Composite Index 
 
This table presents additional results to Table 2 (corresponding to columns (4) and (8)), where the dependent 
variable is average daily percentage return within the month. Survey data is available 2006-2011 and the dummy 
variable TensionExpectation takes value of 1 in months in which political tension is expected to increase over the 
next month, and 0 otherwise. The GDP variable corresponds to the quarterly GDP growth rate in percentages of 
the corresponding region (Taiwan or mainland China). The dummy DPP in power that takes value one when the 
pro-independence party is in power in Taiwan, and zero otherwise. Reported standard errors are robust to both 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary autocorrelation. Statistical significance is reported at the 10% (*), 5% 
(**) and 1% (***) level. 
 
 
  Chinese firms   Chinese firms 
  Event study   Survey data 
  Shenzhen Stock Index   Shenzhen Stock Index 
      
TensionEvents  -1.43**    
  (0.60)    
TensionExpectation     -0.03 
     (0.10) 
GDP     -0.23 
     (0.20) 
DPP in power     0.51*** 
     (0.17) 
Number of obs.  230   63 
Period fixed effect  Yes   - 
2nd order time trend  -   Yes 
R
2
  0.05   0.10 
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Table A.2. Cumulative Abnormal Returns: Regression Results 
 
This table shows the regression results to draw average CAR and its confidence interval of Figure 2. The abnormal 
return is calculated as the realized return beyond the average return during the 80 trading days prior to the event 
window, i.e. dates [-100,-21]. This calculation of returns is at the firm-event level, i.e. for each firm in each event we 
calculate a different normal return based the average return during the estimation window. The confidence intervals 
are established around 10-day average CARs, which are obtained by regressing CAR on period-dummies (one for 
each interval [-20, -11], [-10, -1], … , [50, 59]) and estimating firm-day clustered standard errors. Statistical 
significance is reported at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. 
 
 
 
CAR 
 
  
[-20, -11] -0.08 
 (0.30) 
[-10, -1] -0.94* 
 (0.56) 
[0, 9] -5.38*** 
 (0.86) 
[10, 19] -7.13*** 
 (1.07) 
[20, 29] -9.47*** 
 (1.06) 
[30, 39] -8.35*** 
 (1.32) 
[40,49] -9.09*** 
 (1.73) 
[50, 59] -7.36*** 
 (1.53) 
Constant -0.00 
 (0.00) 
  
Observations 225,258 
R-squared 0.02 
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Table A.3. Risk of War: Effect of Tension on Chinese firms by Location 
 
This table presents results complementary to Table 3. Panel A controls for investment and export by Taiwanese 
firms to the industries of the Chinese firm sample. Mainland exposure (Exposure) is defined either as i) total exports 
of each firm’s industry to mainland China (in the previous calendar year) normalized by the total exports to all 
countries, or as ii) cumulative investment (without depreciation) in mainland China of each firm’s industry 
normalized by the total asset value of that industry. Both measures are in percentage terms. Since the investment 
variable is unavailable prior to 1998 we apply the time constant average thereof, leaving it unreported due to the 
fixed effects. In Panel B, regressions (1) and (4) are the same as those reported in Table 3. In regressions (2) and (5) 
a separate bivariate dummy OtherCoast is added for the coastal provinces Hainan, Guangxi and Jiangsu. Similarly, 
regressions (3) and (6) include a dummy OtherClose for the provinces of Hainan, Guangxi, Hunan, Jiangxi, Anhui 
and Jiangsu. The sample period and all other variables are as defined in Table 2. Due to firm fixed effects all time-
constant dummies drop out when not interacted with political tension measures. Two-way clustered standard errors 
are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is reported at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. 
 
Panel A: Controlling for trade links 
 
Outcome Variable: (Average) Daily Stock Returns in % 
 Event study Survey data 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Exports Investment  Exports Investment 
      
TensionEvent -0.77* -0.65*    
 (0.45) (0.38)    
TensionExpectation    -0.03 -0.03 
    (0.14) (0.14) 
SouthEast * TensionEvents -0.23 -0.26*    
 (0.15) (0.14)    
SouthEast * TensionExpectation    -0.03* -0.03** 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
      
Exposure -0.00   -0.01**  
 (0.00)   (0.00)  
Exposure * TensionEvent 0.01 0.01    
 (0.01) (0.01)    
Exposure * TensionExpectation    0.00** 0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) 
      
Ln(Total Assets) -0.03 -0.03  -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.04) (0.04)  (0.04) (0.04) 
Leverage 0.04 0.04  0.00 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03)  (0.02) (0.02) 
Return on Assets 0.55*** 0.55***  0.39*** 0.39*** 
 (0.21) (0.20)  (0.11) (0.11) 
Beta -0.02 -0.02  -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03) 
GDP    0.44 0.44 
    (0.28) (0.28) 
DPP in power    -0.11 -0.12 
    (0.46) (0.46) 
      
Number of observations 166,425 166,216  90,410 90,410 
Number of firms 1,314 1,314  1,565 1,565 
Period fixed effect Yes Yes  - - 
2nd order time trend - -  Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.01 0.01  0.04 0.04 
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Panel B: Controlling for other provinces 
 
 
Outcome Variable: (Average) Daily Stock Returns in %     
 Event study  Survey data 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 SouthEast OtherCoast OtherClos
e 
 SouthEast OtherCoast OtherClose 
        
TensionEvent -0.63* -0.63* -0.64*     
 (0.36) (0.37) (0.37)     
TensionExpectation     0.00 0.01 0.01 
     (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
SouthEast * TensionEvents -0.27* -0.27* -0.27*     
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.14)     
SouthEast * TensionExpect.     -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** 
     (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
        
OtherCoast * TensionEvent  0.01      
  (0.04)      
OtherCoast * TensionExpect.      -0.02  
      (0.01)  
OtherClose * TensionEvent   0.03     
   (0.06)     
OtherClose * TensionExpect.       -0.01 
       (0.01) 
        
Ln(Total Assets) -0.03 -0.03 -0.03  0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Leverage 0.04 0.04 0.04  0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Return on Assets 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.55***  0.39*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Beta -0.02 -0.02 -0.02  -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
GDP     0.44 0.44 0.44 
     (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
DPP in power     -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 
     (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) 
        
Number of observations 166,425 166,425 166,425  90,410 90,410 90,410 
Number of firms 1,314 1,314 1,314  1,565 1,565 1,565 
Period fixed effect Yes Yes Yes  - - - 
2nd order time trend - - -  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.04 0.04 0.04 
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Table A.4. Placebo Analysis: Effect of Events Uncorrelated With Cross-Strait Tension  
 
This table supports claims in footnote 15 and corresponds to results in Table 3. Specifically, we repeat the analysis 
using three events that do not relate to the conflict, i.e. i) the 21 September 1999 earthquake in Taiwan, ii) the 9/11 
terrorist attacks in 2001 and iii) increased tension in Japan-Taiwan relations following the ‘Lianhe fishing boat 
incident’ on June 10 2008, where a Taiwanese fishing vessel collided with a Japanese patrol vessel in disputed 
territorial waters claimed by both sides. The dependent variable is daily percentage returns. The daily data consists 
of the 20 days before and after the historical events, where the dummy TensionEvent takes value 1 on announcement 
days and the trading day that follows, and 0 otherwise. The regressions include binary dummies (period fixed effect) 
filtering out average return within each event window. Two-way clustered standard errors (clustering on firm-day) 
are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is reported at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. 
 
Outcome Variable: Daily Stock Returns in % 
 (1) (2) 
 Average Effect Effect by Political Connection 
   
TensionEvent -2.17*** -2.17*** 
 (0.44) (0.37) 
AntiChina* TensionEvent  0.20 
  (0.31) 
   
Ln(Total Assets) -0.03 0.11 
 (0.06) (0.09) 
Leverage 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.08) (0.15) 
Return on Assets 0.41 0.06 
 (0.56) (1.16) 
Beta -0.46** -0.25 
 (0.19) (0.25) 
   
Number of observations 54,746 5,820 
Number of firms 718 68 
Period fixed effect Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.04 0.03 
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Table A.5. Political Tension and Party Popularity 
 
This table supports claims in footnote 16 on political tension affecting party popularity. Survey data is available 
2006-2011 and the dummy variable TensionExpectation takes value of 1 in months in which political tension is 
expected to increase over the next month, and 0 otherwise. We take a measure on the popularity of the two parties 
(measured by so-called Kuomintang Trust Index, KMTTrust, and Democratic Progressive Party Trust Index, 
DPPTrust) and regress the growth rate thereof on the TensionExpectations dummy. Reported standard errors are 
robust to both arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary autocorrelation. Statistical significance is reported at the 
10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 DPP Popularity: DPPTrust KMT Popularity: KMTTrust 
   
TensionExpectation 0.05** -0.05*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
   
Constant 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
   
Observations 63 63 
R-squared 0.00 0.13 
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Table A.6. Effects of being Politically Connected with the Election-winning Party 
 
This table supports claims in footnote 16 on election outcomes affecting stock returns. The dependent variable is 
daily percentage returns. The daily data consists of the 20 days before and after the Taiwan Presidential election in 
2004 and 2008, where DPPwins is a dummy equal to 1 if DPP wins in the presidential election and 0 otherwise. 
Two-way clustered standard errors (clustering on firm-day) are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is 
reported at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. 
 
 
Outcome variable: Daily Stock Returns (in %) 
 (1) 
  
  
DPPwins -3.71*** 
 (1.25) 
AntiChina*DPPwins 0.69* 
 (0.41) 
DPP in power 0.22 
 (0.43) 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.08 
 (0.09) 
Leverage -0.20*** 
 (0.06) 
Return on Assets 0.87* 
 (0.45) 
Beta 0.06 
 (0.13) 
  
Number of observations 5,118 
Number of firms 68 
Period fixed effect Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes 
R-squared 0.08 
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Table A.7.  Mainland Investment and Foreign Sales 
 
The table display time dummy estimates from regression (4) in section 4 where the outcome variable is either 
(change in) accumulative mainland investment or (change in) foreign sales of Taiwanese firms in millions of 
Taiwanese dollars. Time is measured quarterly (for mainland investment) or annually (for foreign sales). The sample 
period is quarter -8 to quarter +8 (year -2 to year +2) surrounding event dates, but for brevity we do not report 
coefficients for dummies for quarters prior to -3 and after +3 in regressions 1-2. For regressions (2) and (4) time = 0 
is the time period including the event date of event e, while changes in an outcome variable in period t are measured 
as the increase/decrease from its level in period t and to that in t+1. 
 
 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Investment ΔInvestment  For.Sales ΔFor.Sales 
      
time==-3 210.21*** -35.59    
 (44.94) (26.94)    
time==-2 249.31*** -53.01    
 (45.88) (36.68)    
time==-1 276.97*** -51.18**  1,296.67 -637.28 
 (70.83) (23.94)  (2,630.41) (1,374.92) 
time==0 301.50*** -34.91  789.17 1,382.11 
 (81.67) (25.14)  (3,039.36) (1,729.73) 
time==1 348.58*** -34.19  3,443.14 -139.15 
 (85.50) (26.57)  (3,289.90) (1,285.89) 
time==2 398.42*** -7.77  4,696.44*** -2,119.37 
 (103.90) (41.94)  (968.18) (1,568.39) 
time==3 474.90*** -72.93**    
 (94.38) (30.98)    
(time==-3)*AntiChina -31.84 14.67    
 (108.94) (15.64)    
(time==-2)*AntiChina 3.15 20.92    
 (115.91) (25.65)    
(time==-1)*AntiChina -8.71 28.45  2,984.52 1,720.22*** 
 (129.23) (23.28)  (5,861.13) (573.23) 
(time==0)*AntiChina -11.26 -56.04  7,070.39*** -2,471.40** 
 (143.75) (55.01)  (2,683.14) (1,209.02) 
(time==1)*AntiChina -104.18 8.33  2,231.44 -1,585.17 
 (126.89) (13.22)  (4,932.55) (1,934.97) 
(time==2)*AntiChina -134.92 -12.00  1,211.04 1,294.00 
 (147.48) (55.98)  (1,162.21) (970.71) 
(time==3)*AntiChina -176.42 25.46    
 (134.58) (29.13)    
      
Constant 9,652.49*** -1.10  -21,595.39 -3,357.82*** 
 (244.11) (18.42)  (15,475.31) (1,209.23) 
      
Time dummy Quarterly Quarterly  Annual Annual 
Observations 2,171 2,218  597 557 
Number of Stocks 43 50  48 48 
R-squared 0.92 0.08  0.70 0.23 
 
 
 
